Budapest
City Court as Court of Appeals
Ref. no.: 52.Pf.29.063/2003.
Dr. ÁDÁM György as plaintiff makes
the following
C o u n t e r a p p e a l
against
the appeal lodged by HEGEDŰS Lóránt Jr, defendant in the civil case for
infringement of my inalienable personal rights, which appeal I received on 19th
September, 2003:
I request that the verdict delivered
by the Court be upheld. I do not claim compensation for the costs of the
lawsuit.
J u s t i f i c a t i o n :
I.
1.) The defendant claims in his appeal: “The Court, partly for lack of
application of section 85 of the Civil Code, partly because it ignored or
counteracted the precedents of verdict which it should have followed, it
reached an illegal verdict. The judiciary can under no circumstances place
itself in the position of the legislative. Under the completely clear, precise
and unequivocal contents of paragraph 1 of section 85 of the Civil Code, the
rights of a person can only be asserted
personally. The plaintiff received no injury from the article, the article
is not about the plaintiff, the defendant had no knowledge of the plaintiff
until thee lawsuit was presented, the defendant to this day has not made the
acquaintance of the plaintiff to this day.” (paragraph 2 and 3 of page one, phrase
bolded by defendant)
Plaintiff’s response:
Defendant claims in his appeal that the Court “reached an illegal
verdict.” He supports this claim with four “arguments.”
a.) lack of application of section
85 of the Civil Code.
b.) The Judge took a contrary
position to the interpretation the Court was bound to follow.
c.)
The Judge, the defendant claims, has placed himself “in the position of the
legislative” instead of the judiciary.
d.) I – the plaintiff – received no personal injury by
way of the article…
All four arguments of the defendant, that an error of legal procedure
has been made, are unacceptable.
ad a.) The defendant's statement – in which he claims
that the court did not consider the 85th section of the Civil Code
in its verdict – is in contrast with the facts set down in the reasoning. In
the justification of the ruling the Judge offers a detailed analysis of the
application of paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code – as an element of
position. The justification of the ruling says: “The grammatical and
theleological(?) analysis of paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code
is none other, than that a third party, unaffected by the illegal behaviour,
has no right to file a lawsuit for a wrong caused to anyone other than
themselves. This is explained by the fact, that in the case of personal rights,
the affected person is the one, who is alone capable of deciding whether they
were wronged, and if yes, whether they want to take actions against said wrong.
The legislator never intended any other interpretation by the judiciary.” (Page
3, paragraphs 5-6.)
Thus – the Judge – made an outstandingly precise,
theoretically unimpeachable analysis of the law, including the analysis of the
intent of the legislator. Paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code – as
the Judge noted in the analysis – could not be interpreted any other way.
ad b.) The Judge in the first degree Court made his
decision bearing in mind the fact that paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil
Code was binding for the Court, did not take a contrasting position with said
section, and therefore took a decision in keeping with the spirit of the law
and legal precedents. The defendant could not point out in his appeal, how and
in what way the Judge took a position in contrast with “binding precedents of
ruling”, simply made an ex chatedra statement.
ad c.) In the current legal dispute the Judge in the
first degree Court – according to the defendant – has placed himself in the
“position of the legislative”.
The Judge applied the effective items of legislation (paragraph (1) of
section 75 of the Civil Code, section 76 of the Civil Code, paragraph (1) of
section 76 of the Civil Code, paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code) as
precisely as possible – in keeping with the spirit of the law, and in keeping
with precedents – without adding or omitting any items of law, thus took a
decision after free deliberation, on the basus of his convictions, complying
with paragraph (1) of section 206 of the Civil Code. The fact that “personal rights
may be defended personally solely” underlining by defendant), was
considered fully by the Judge, and based his ruling on said item. Thus the
defendant's statement that the Judge in the first degree Court placed “himself
in the position of the legislative”, is indeed false.
ad d.) The defendant claims that I – the plaintiff –
was not personally wronged in any way by the article entitled “Ébresztő”. This
statement disregards the entire reasoning of my lawsuit, and my subsequent
“notes”, in which I proved – expressis verbis – the opposite. It is merely a
“rabulistic” counter-argument, when the defendant remarks that “until the
filing of the lawsuit, the defendant was unaware of the existence of the
plaintiff, and remains unacquainted with the plaintiff to this day,” and that
“the article is not about the plaintiff.”
If the “article” is not about me – and the “army of riff-raff from
Galicia”, who had fates similar to mine – then who is it about? If the “article” is not about me, and Jews
who share my experiences, then why did the defendant write it? The fact that
the so-called article is about those whom others deem Jewish, in the most
pejorative, hateful tone, demanding our exclusion from society, cannot be
denied! The defendant's claim that the “article” is not about me, is untrue. No
personal acquaintance is necessary, the direct demand of exclusion of Hungarian
Jews from society will suffice! This has been so for a thousand years in
Hungarian history (I shall discuss this in detail later), and has recurred
countless times during my lifetime. When I filed for lawsuit I noted for
instance that in 1938 – when a Eucharisticus Congress was held on Hősök tere in
Budapest, and Cardinal Pachelly (later Pope Pius XII) and cardinal Justinián
Serédi made speeches in which they incited hatred against the Jews, praising
Hitler, I was halted by a mob of participating youths who decided I was a Jew,
and nearly beat me to death. Those meting out the beating did not know me, but
neither did the inciter cardinals Pachelly and Serédi – they were unaware of my
existence – yet I was placed in mortal danger, I received life-threatening
injuries as a result of the two priests' incitements to hatred against Jews.
Nor was I personally known by father Banga , – when he delivered his hateful
speeches in preparation of the anti-Jewish laws – or by Prime Ministers
Darányi, Imrédi, Bárdosi, “nation leader” Szálasi, or even by the arrow-cross
and SA soliders setting up gas chambers in the Kőszeg brewery, yet they killed
my younger brother András and chased me, until I was on the brink of death.
Thus, the fact that again a priest – inciting to hatred against the Jews – does
not know me is irrelevant according to the law. The legal requirements of a
serious breach of my personal rights – against which I took personal action
under paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code – were satisfied. Personal
acquaintance or being specifically named are not requirements of section 76 of
the Civil Code.
II.
In
his appeal the defendant states: “No wise arguments can make up for the
complete lack of explicit compliance with the law, and no metaphysical
speculation can take the place of compulsorily applicable items of
legislation.” (final paragraph of first page of the appeal)
Plaintiff's response:
I agree with the claims of the
defendant in that “no wise arguments can make up for the complete lack of
explicit compliance with the law...” Howere, the wise arguer – for a lack of
explicit compliance with the law – is the defendant himself.
Because I, in my file for lawsuit
and notes, then the Judge of the first degree Court in his ruling referred to
specific items of legislation (see ad c.) point 1.), ignoring these is
“metaphysical speculation” which the defendant enlists.
The
justification of the ruling offers a detailed analysis of the application of
pieces of legislation. This is featured specifically from page 3 to the bottom
of page 4 of the justification, but the passage lasts practically up to
paragraph three of page 9. Nowhere does the ruling feature “wise arguments” or
“metaphysical speculation”. All these are the defendant's arbitrary,
unsubstantiated “arguments”.
III.
In his appeal the defendant claims:
“The First Degree Court, whether intentionally or not, disputes throughout the
imperative rule set down in paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code, but
as a result of concrete and completely unequivocal wording, the dispute is
hopeless, because the Court is not a legislative organ, but an applier of law.”
(final paragraph page one, first paragraph page two)
Plaintiff's response:
The first degree Court did not
“dispute” the “imperative rule set down in paragraph (1) of section 85 of the
Civil Code” from page 2 to 9, on the contrary, the Court cites the item of
legislation in question to justify the application of the ruling. The
justification is in fact in dispute solely with the Supreme Court ruling PK 13
– which is seriously in breach of the law, yet sometimes applied by Courts in
rulings referring to section 76 of the Civil Code – or rather proves the
inapplicability of the passage in the current legal proceedings.
The first degree Court wrote the
following about the “dispute”: “The Court did not accept defendant's referral
to the Supreme Court ruling PK 13. The FK 13 ruling states that a correction
in the press may be demanded by those who were referred to – by name or
other manner – in the printed piece, or who are recognisable from the contents
of said piece. The text unequivocally shows that the ruling was stated
specifically for procedures of correction in the press. Furthermore, in case of
section 85 of the Civil Code, the PK 13 cannot be applied because it would bring the injured party
into a more disadvantageous position than allowed by the Constitution.
Interpretations in contrast with the Constitution are forbidden with reference
to any item of legislation. In case of fundamental rights, analogies or
implicit interpretations may only be applied for the advantage of the injured
party! The PK 13 ruling, often cited by the parties, and often applied by
Court, is not a binding item of legislation for individual cases, neither is it
suitable for the interpretation of paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil
Code. The direct, personal involvement does not, in this case, mean that a person
must be specifically named, such an interpretation would be extremely unfair
and injurious for those involved, as there are many ways of making unfair,
injurious or discriminative statements about persons without specifically
naming them. It is sufficient, if an essential substance of the given person is
recognisable, which constitutes an attribute of their existence, recognisable
to others. (ruling, page 3, paragraphs 6-11, and page 4 first paragraph).
Plaintiff's opinion: The
Judge of the first degree Court made a detailed, professional statement on the
single “disputed” issue (whether the Supreme Court ruling PK 13 on “press
corrections” may be applied through “analogy” to section 76 of the Civil Code),
noting that it could NOT be applied. It is peculiar that the defendant did not
extend to this legal anomaly (whether it is applicable or not) in his appeal. I
believe that the defendant has accepted my position given on 20th
May, 2003 with regards to his counter suit made on 13th April, 2003,
in which I said that “...the Supreme Court's ruling PK 13 refers to section 79
of the Civil Code and cannot be applied – even as analogy – as a guiding
principle for the interpretation of section 76.” Then later: “Whoever makes a
verdict on the basis of the PK 13 ruling – applying it in the instance of
section 76 of the Civil Code – does not understand the law” (first paragraph of
second page of my notes).
Apart from this – forced – “legal
dispute” there was no dispute of any kind as to the application of paragraph
(1) of section 85 of the Civil Code, it was applied by the Judge “as a result
of perfectly unequivocal wording”, based on the “personal representation” of
the plaintiff as set in the lawsuit. Whoever casts a doubt on this unequivocal
interpretation of the law “is certain to lose in the dispute” because the Court
is not a legislative organ, but simply applies the law.” (The reciprocal
wording of defendant's argument is appropriate in the present dispute.)
IV.
Defendant
states in his appeal: “It is only for the sake of proper form that I mention
that the first degree Court's statement, which claims that no real defence has
been mounted against the suit is false, as the citation of precedents and the
proposal of acquiring said precedents is an unequivocal answer to the issues
raised by the suit.” (page 2, paragraph 2)
Plaintiff's response:
Reference to 43 precedents and the proposal of acquiring said precedents is not
a real defence in the present specific dispute, because the rulings referred to
by the defendant were made on the basis of entirely different legal situations.
The 43 plaintiffs cited entirely different positions in the 3 lawsuits, having
made a stance “in the name of the communities affected”, which citations are
light years away from my suit, in which I sought to defend my personal rights
in PERSONAL! The defendant failed to make a REASONABLE response to this.
V.
In his
appeal the defendant says: “Not to mention that rather significant circumstance
of fact that the reasoning of the first degree Court, which was in contrast
with the written letter of the law, cannot even be applied in the manner that
it was in the case of the earlier plaintiffs who lost their lawsuit, because
the plaintiff d o e s n o t e v e n
c l a i m that he effectively belongs to the Jewish Community, that
is, that he is of Jewish extraction, and in the knowledge of this it is
completely impossible that the Court should establish a serious breach of
personal rights, which could not have occurred even according to the
plaintiff's argument.” (page 2, paragraph 3, bold characters by defendant)
Plaintiff's opinion:
Defendant's argument is yet again rabulistic, he twists the statements made in
the course of the legal dispute. The reality – which I have stated in every submission
I have made so far, but for the sake of those less swift of mind – I shall
explain from another angle: I am a materialist, which is my
Constitution-granted right. I do not accept – in my view of the world – any
religion (Jewish, Christian, Islam, etc.). My view of the world, my system of
beliefs are my private affair, and are noone else's business. I was regarded as
Jewish from the age of six until the age of 82 (which is what I am now) without
exception, therefore, my fate was arranged according to this view constructed
of me by others. It has, however,
always been irrelevant – and remains so in the current legal dispute – whether
I see MYSELF as Jewish or materialist, not to mention that a materialist who
sees himself as Jewish is completely lacking in logic.
The defendant, by attempting to turn
against me, in a legal dispute, my Constitution-granted right of having a
materialist view of the world, has violated logic! Being honourable, I could
not in all honesty claim that I see myeself as Jewish in the suit of law,
because that is in contrast with my view of the world.
The defendant, however, mixed two –
independent – facts in his appeal: “religion” and “origins” are different. In
my suit I said I refused to make a statement of my “origins”, a confidential
piece of information, all I stated was that I was homo sapiens (that is I am
vertabrate), the rest is nobody's business. However, until now (for 82 years) –
everyone else – thought of me as Jewish, and this determine their way of
relating to me: some are neutral, some are loathing, some turn away, and some
are loving for this reason. In this legal dispute however, the one and only
fact is that OTHERS see me as such.
“Religion” again is a different
factor. The Hungarian State recorded the religion of its inhabitants for a
thousand years, and determined their rights and obligations on that basis. I
–who do not believe in any “religion” - could not tell the Court anything, but
that I am not of the Jewish faith, because I have no faith. The case is the
same as above, OTHERS have always regarded me as of the Jewish “faith” (and
continue to do so today), and this is the very crux of the current legal
dispute.
My
opinion is that it would be “completely absurd if the Court” failed to
“establish a breach of my personal rights”, and calls to EXCLUSION of
the kind that plagued my entire life (especially the period between 1938 and 2nd
May, 1945). Calls to exclusion, whose twins resulted in the murder of my
closest relatives, and hounded me to the threshold of death. An “independent
democratic state of law and order” cannot tolerate calls on its citizens to
exclude a certain group of its citizens, in such a form that already took place
once before, and which forms – upon repeated calls for exclusion – could happen
again.
VI.
In his appeal the defendant writes:
“On such a basis anyone could sue anyone at anytime – and according to the
ruling of the first degree Court – with success, for example in Turkey in the
defence of Kurds, in Transylvania, in Slovakia, in Serbia in defence of the
Hungarian minority, even though they are not Kurds or Hungarians!!!” (page 2,
paragraph 4, three exclamation marks by the defendant)
Plaintiff's opinion on the issue:
The defendant's examples are exceedingly witty.
It is a shame that he failed to consider a basic item of law when coming up
with the examples. Let us take the Turks and Kurds. If there is a Turk in
Turkey, who is not a Kurd but has always been seen as a Kurd by everyone, and
has therefore suffered throughout his life all the exlcusions inflicted by by
Turks on Kurds, and then this Turk – regarded a Kurd – takes legal action
against the inciter of hatred in defence of his personal rights, has every
right to take action to protect his personal rights, and will, in all
likelihood win the lawsuit in Turkey. The case is similar with the
Transylvanian Romanian regarded by everyone as Hungarian in Transylvania. If
this non-Hungarian, who is, however, regarded as one, suffers all the
discriminations that Transylvanian Hungarians have suffered since the Trianon
treaty and launches a lawsuit against a Romanian citizen calling on Romanians
to discriminate against Hungarians – if Romania is an independent, democratic
state of law – he will win his lawsuit launched because of a breach of his
personal rights. There is no point in continuing to analyse whether the case
would be the same in Slovakia or Serbia.
VII.
In the previous six points I
refuted, without exception, every single argument put forward by the defendant.
However, especially because of the mindset of the defendant, I shall supplement
the facts of circumstance with a few more data.
1.) Hungary has a history of over a
thousand one hundred (1100) years. When Hungarians entered the Carpathian basin
Jews were already settled here. Over the past thousand years Hungarians have
always endeavoured to exclude the Jews living here, and the Jews seeking refuge
from discrimination elsewhere. Defendant's writing in “Ébresztő” entitled
“Christian Hungarian State!” calls for the exclusion of Jews (riff-raff from
Galicia), a simple continuation of a thousand year-old “tradition”. The
“Hungarian Lexicon of Law” vol. VI (edited by Dr Dezső Márkus, published by
Budapest Pallas Irodalmi és Nyomdai Rt. 1907, pp. 1154-1155) writes the following
on “the rights of Jews in Hungary” (the quoted passage was written by Dr Gyula
Weiszoberg):
„It has been proven beyond doubt
that Jews have lived in Hungary since the century of the occupation of the land
by Hungarians, and may have arrived here much earlier, following the Roman
legions to Pannonia. The first mention of Jews in our codes of law is from
1092, when the synod of Szabolcs took the effect of law, which ruled that if a
Jew has a Christian wife or owns a Christian slave, said slaves are to be set
free, and their price be stripped from said Jews and reimbursed to the
archbishops (book I of the decrees of St László). The decrees also include a
rule, which says that the tools of Jews who work on a Sunday be confiscated
(book I, chapter ten). King Kálmán's decrees feature more rules pertaining to
Jews. The rule forbidding Jews to own Christian slaves was renewed, and new
measures were implemented, such as the one that ruled that a Jewish farmer
could only own a pagan slave,”
“Endre II's Golden Bull forbids Jews
and Ishmaelites from becoming minters, salt or tax officers. It is known that
the King did not really honour the regulations set down in the Bull, and
therefore Pope Honorius, through the Archbishop of Kalocsa issued a strict
warning in 1225, ordering the King not to allow Jews to take public office.
Pope Gregory IX has the same complaint in 1231, therefore it is again decreed
that Jews and Saracens cannot head a mint or any other office, but in 1233 the
Pope again makes a complaint.”
“After the end of the raid of the
Tartars, in the course of which Jews were tormented equally by Tartars and
locals because they were said to be Tartars themselves, and to have invited the
raging hordes.”
“The Buda synod of 1279 orders that
Jews were a red mark, that is, Jews were told that they could only appear in
public if they wore a red felt circle on the left of their chest “because it is
very dangerous, and in contrast with holy law, that Jews be indistinguishable
of Christians”. If a Christian were to come into contact with a Jew who does
not wear the mark, were he to give him fire or water, said Christian will fall
under interdictum.”
“Thus the ban on Jews bearing office
was renewed, and punishments were set for Christians who breach this rule.”
„Then in 1514 a rule was set down on
the form of the oath made by a Jew before a Christian. The Jew, dressed in a
cloak, with a hat on his head and bare feet must turn towards the sun, place
his hand on the bible and swear an oath, cursing himself should he make a false
oath. This oath was the «more judacco». After the battle of Mohács, the
Székesfehérvár Parliament elected János Szapolyai King, and decreed that Jews
were to be chased from the entire country.”
“A substantial change in the legal
status of Jews did not take place until the reign of Maria-Theresia. She
ordered the payment of the “tax of tolerance”, but maintained and enacted some
rules of exception on Jews. Jews were not allowed to dwell in Croatia-Slavonia,
or in Baranya or Heves county, or in any mining town or free chartered
boroughs. If they entered a town, even if for a single day, they had to pay
customs duty. In Székesfehérvár, for instance, 1.30 forints.”
“The war of independence made Jews'
dreams of equality come true. On 28th July, 1849 the Szeged
Parliament approved the law to grant equal rights to Jews without debate, but
the armistice at Világos a fortnight later made the enactment of the law
impossible. Only the 18th Act of 1867 declared that “the Israelite
residents of the country are declared as having equal rights to all civilian
and political rights enjoyed by Christians”.
I attach the two pages of the
lexicon to the above extracts as supplement A to the counter appeal.
2.) I attach to this present
submission attachment B.), the 42nd Act of 1895 on the Israelite
religion, published in the Corpus Juris Hungarici, where footnote (1) lists the
Acts and statutory instruments applicable to Jews. The first was made by St
László in 1092 (book I. Chapter 10), which stated: Chapter 10.: “Of
Jews, if they should take a Christian woman as partner: “If a Jew takes a
Christian woman, or keeps a Christian person in slavery in his house, he will
be dispossessed therefrom, their freedom shall be returns and he who sold them
will be stripped of the price, which shall be the income of the bishops”.
Chapter 26.: “Of Jews working on a holy day” “If someone on Sunday or any other
major holy day finds a Jew at work, in order to avoid the outrage of
Christians, he should confiscate the tool with which the Jew worked.”
King Kálmán (ruled between 1095 and
1114) Book I, Chapter 74.: “On Jews keeping a Christian family”: “Let no Jew
dare buy, sell or keep Christian slaves. Chapter 75.: “Those who have a farm
may tend it with pagan servants. Jews, should they have the means, may purchase
grazing animals, but they may not live elsewhere than in an episcopal see”.
3.) The Hungarian legislative
enacted no Jewish law between 1895 and 1920, but on 26th September,
1920 – during the time of the White Terror – the 25th Act, the first
“numerus clausus” was announced (the Act did not use the term Jewish, but
everyone knew it was about the exclusion of Jews from universities). The former
is attached as Supplement C.).
Dear Budapest City Court, acting as
second degree Court,
In Chapters I-VI of the present
counter appeal I proved that the defendant's appeal was unable to cast the
least doubt on the first degree verdict. The first degree verdict is faultless
in form and content. Chapter VII of the present submission – in light of the
appeal – casts even more light on the fact that the defendant hopes to continue
a – historically extremely damaging, illegal – process in the third millennium,
in an independent, democratic state of law, which must not be allowed. The
Hungarian judiciary is duty bound to use legal means to prevent the process
aiming to “exclude the Jews from society”.
I respectfully request that the
ruling of the first degree Court be upheld, especially the section that states
that I act in person.
Budapest,
4th November, 2003.
Dr.
György Ádám
plaintiff
solicitor
Budapest City Court, as second degree Court.
Ref. no: 52.Pf.29.063/2003.
c o u n t e r
a p p e a l
by
plaintiff Dr György Ádám (solicitor)
in a lawsuit against Loránt . Hegedűs Jr, for breach
of personal rights
in which he requests that the
first degree verdict is upheld.
attachments:
1 lexicon extract
2 former Acts from Corpus Juris Hungarici
I attach two pages of the lexicon to
the above extract as supplement A.) to the counter appeal.
2.) I attach to the present
submission Supplement B.), the 42nd Act of 1895 on the Israelite
religion, published in Corpus Juris Hungarici, footnote (1) of which lists the
different Acts and statutory instruments on Jews. The first was made by St
László in 1092 (book I. Chapter 10), which stated: Chapter 10.: “Of
Jews, if they should take a Christian woman as partner: “If a Jew takes a
Christian woman, or keeps a Christian person in slavery in his house, he will
be dispossessed therefrom, their freedom shall be returns and he who sold them
will be stripped of the price, which shall be the income of the bishops”.
Chapter 26.: “Of Jews working on a holy day” “If someone on Sunday or any other
major holy day finds a Jew at work, in order to avoid the outrage of
Christians, he should confiscate the tool with which the Jew worked.”
King Kálmán (ruled between 1095 and
1114) Book I, Chapter 74.: “On Jews keeping a Christian family”: “Let no Jew
dare buy, sell or keep Christian slaves. Chapter 75.: “Those who have a farm
may tend it with pagan servants. Jews, should they have the means, may purchase
grazing animals, but they may not live elsewhere than in an episcopal see”.
I note that the 42nd Act
of 1895 on the “Israelite religion” was nullified by the first sentence of
section (1) of the 8th Act of 1942 on the “regulation of the
Israelite community” (supplement E to my letter of appeal). The Jewish religion
was – de jure – a “legally recognised religion” for 47 years in the course of
Hungary's thousand year-long history, but – de facto – only until 1920, that is
for no more than a quarter century (see contents of next point).
3.) The Hungarian legislative
enacted no Jewish law between 1895 and 1920, but on 26th September,
1920 – during the time of the White Terror – the 25th Act, the first
“numerus clausus” was announced (the Act did not use the term Jewish, but
everyone knew it was about the exclusion of Jews from universities). The former
is attached as Supplement C.).
4.) Under supplement D.) I attach to
the present counter appeal a short study, prepared on the basis of historical
research, to prove the consequences of the defendant's call to exclude Jews
(“riff-raff from Galicia”) in the 19th Century in Hungary. These
consequences still exist today. In this year (2003) there was a two-day
conference in Nyíregyháza on the Tiszaeszlár trial and the conclusions it
offers, and some political parties were represented. Noone participated on
behalf of MIÉP, but at the time of the conference they laid a wreath on the
grave of Eszter Solymosi, which was an open admission that a hundred and twenty
years after the shameful events the horrible claims of the “blood libel” are
still with us. I shall also note that in 1946 (sic.) there was a serious
anti-Semitic pogrom in Kunmadaras (including murders) which – I do not know why
– is not usually talked about, but only a spark is needed for a thousand years
of hatred against Jews to burst into flames again in Hungary. My aim by
submitting the study to the Court is to prove the circumstances and backgrounds
of incitements to hatred by the defendant amongst certain Hungarians. The
defendant's incitement to hatred against Jews has extremely dangerous historical
precedents, and possible consequences, unless the judiciary, executive and
legislative all take legal but determined action.
Dear Budapest City Court, acting as
second degree Court,
In Chapters I-VI of the present counter appeal I proved that the
defendant's appeal was unable to cast the least doubt on the first degree
verdict. The first degree verdict is faultless in form and content. Chapter VII
of the present submission – in light of the appeal – casts even more light on
the fact that the defendant hopes to continue a – historically extremely
damaging, illegal – process in the third millennium, in an independent,
democratic state of law, which must not be allowed and which incitement by the
defendant could yet again put my life at risk, as between 1938 and May, 1945.
The Hungarian judiciary is duty bound to use legal means to prevent the process
aiming to “exclude the Jews from society”, in order to protect, amongst others,
me.
I respectfully request that the
ruling of the first degree Court be upheld, especially the section that states
that I act in person.
Budapest,
5th January, 2004.
Dr
György Ádám
plaintiff
solicitor
Budapest City Court, as second degree Court.
Ref. no: 52.Pf.29.063/2003.
c o u n t e r
a p p e a l
by
plaintiff Dr György Ádám (solicitor)
in a lawsuit against Loránt . Hegedűs Jr, for breach
of personal rights
in which he requests that the
first degree verdict is upheld.
attachments:
1 lexicon extract
2 former Acts from Corpus Juris Hungarici
1 historical study on the Tiszaeszlár trial of the 19th
Century
Ferenc
Rajniss 9th October, 1940., interpellation
in the Lower House.
“The second Jewish Act can be exploited with the help of the strohmans
and “aladárs”. These strohmans include legislators, retired state
functionaries, even relatives of the Prime Minister. Exploiting the Jewish Act
is a veritable business, and has thus become a hotbed of abuse and corruption.”
First
Klessheim visit, 16th and 17th April, 1943.
Horthy
in dispute with Hitler: “I cannot beat them to death, after all.”
Pest
County Central Court
Ref.
no: 20.P.85.346/2003.
Dr György Ádám, in the civil lawsuit
against Loránt Hegedűs, Jr to establish a breach of personal rights, I make the
following
n o t e s
about the
defendant's counter suit, which I received at my office on 12th May,
2003:
The defendant's claim that I – the
plaintiff – am the “44th” who has launched “such a lawsuit on the
“SAME LEGAL BASIS” against the defendant. The three lawsuits listed by the
defendant were not based on the same item of law, they had no relevance – in
temrs of law – on the lawsuit launched by me. The lawsuits cited by the
defendant are not even in remote connection with the lawsuit and the bass in
law named therein that form the basis of the current procedure against the
defendant. I do not object to the Court acquiring the documents of the trials
listed by the defendant, but I do note that they are irrelevant in the current
legal dispute.
In contrast with the defendant's –
simplistic, generalising – opinion, I am the first who launched a lawsuit
against the defendant for personal involvement(!).
It is in keeping with the truth that under paragraph (1) of section 85
of the Civil Code “personal rights may only be asserted in person”.
(underlining by defendant) I have, however, proved in my letter of lawsuit and
its supplements that – even if indirectly – I am DIRECTLY, PERSONALLY AFFECTED
BY THE TEXT THAT THE DEFENDANT WROTE. I would just like to note here, that
according to the ruling 29.P.90.907/2001/12.: “The Court agreed with the
plaintiff that the text in question was unequivocally “decodable” by the
public, it was a piece of text which depicts the Hungarian Jewish Community, or
at least a part of it, in a very negative light.”
However I – as against the 43 plaintiffs mentioned by the defendant –
have determined, based on logic and history, that the claim that “the subject
of such a text is a community and not specifically the plaintiff” (a
continuation of the ruling cited above) cannot be applied to my case. I
acknowledge that – as the defendant claims – I am not “a lay plaintiff” and
have therefore made not simply the statement made by the 43 plaintiffs, but proved
through law, logics and history that the defendant's “very negative” portrayal affects
me directly, in my person – I, who have already experienced every form of
discrimination shy of having been murdered.
Direct personal involvement – under section 76 of the Civil Code – does
not mean that a person must be named specifically, this “interpretation” was
the result of a serious misrepresentation of the law by the defendant. I quoted
many speeches, treatises, studies, Ministerial agruments etc. in order to prove
this in my letter of lawsuit. Let the defendant show whether these writings –
quoted in my letter of lawsuit and its supplements – name anyone specifically
by name. We see that between 1938 and 1945 the speeches, writings, justifications
of Acts, Acts inciting to or ordering “exclusion” never name anyone
specifically yet resulted in the – almost unimaginably cruel – murder of
600,000 or six hundred thousand innocent Hungarian citizens, and a further
400,000 Hungarian citizens experienced what I described in my letter of
lawsuit.
– 2 –
(May
I note that the Supreme Court's PK 13 ruling is applicable to section 79 of the
Civil Code and cannot be applied – even as analogy – to section 76. The two
items of law are completely different and contain different legal relations,
therefore the analogy – in this case – is a mistake in legal interpretation,
even if there are verdicts that referred to said ruling and therefore the Judge
regarded this “analogy” as precedent. Whoever makes a verdict under the Supreme
Court's PK 13 ruling – applying it to section 76 of the Civil Code – does not
understand the law.
On the basis of all this the
“extraordinarily verbose letter of lawsuit” (defendant's remark) contains the
“necessary facts” set down in paragraph (1) of section 163 of the Civil Code,
and was even a little restrained, considering that I was attempting to assert a
right based on a rarely applied interpretation of the law. Therefore I
emphatically state that the PKKB ruling's statement – quoted earlier – that
“The Court rules that the legislative must make it unequivocal who and in what
form has the right to take a stance against an attack on a community or a part
thereof” cannot be applied in the legal dispute started by me.
It is my view that – in this
specific legal dispute – the legislative needs not “take steps” as the
effective Constitution and Civil Code contain sufficient stipulations on form
and content for the legal circumstance I have presented here. (In the issue
whether the legislative needs to take steps in the case of the 43 plaintiffs, I
shall not take a stance.)
I therefore, in the letter of
lawsuit presented exactly that and in that extent, which was necessary to
decide the merits of my letter of lawsuit.
The defendant notes that the
plaintiff in the cases where the verdict was based on the PKKB ruling, stated
in the letter of lawsuit that “the plaintiff is of Jewish extraction, of the
Israelite faith and a Hungarian citizen.” My letter of lawsuit is not suitable
for the above statement:
ad 1.) I am not prepared to
make a statement of my extraction, I only state that I descend of humans or
homo sapiens.
ad 2.) I am not of the
Israelite faith. I have no faith, but – as I said in my letter of lawsuit – OTHERS
see me as Jewish, Israelite, riff-raff from Galicia, etc, and do not allow me
to shed this “prejorative” eptithet.
ad 3.) I am a Hungarian
citizen. My opinion is that along with ten million compatriots, we must most
resolutely oppose the reemergence of these “discriminative” politics, which we
cannot know where it will lead, to the ghetto, the star of David, forced
labour, deportation or the murder of hundreds of thousands. With such
incitements – which the defendant engages in – it is not impossible, as a
result of such incitements they happened before in Hungary.
This danger again personally
threatens specific Hungarian citizens regarded – by others – as Jewish.
There is no general Jew (riff-raff
from Galicia), only specific people, who are all in mortal danger – on the
basis of such writings – as they were between 1938 and 1945.
A general notion only manifests
itself through specifics. Plato (circa 500 BC) said there was a “world of
ideals” where the general ideals of the Earthly specifics exist. The defendant
would be right if there existed such a world of ideals, and if he had written
about the “riff-raff from Galicia” existing in this world of ideals. However,
even Artistotle (Plato's student) said: “I love Plato, but I love truth better,
and the truth is that there is no world of ideals and there are no ideals.”
Since then we know that the general – according to the rules of logic – is a
generalisation made on the basis of specific items, and can be followed back to
the specifics, as I noted in my letter of lawsuit.
Based on all this, I request that
the defendant's appeal is turned down, and a verdict is delivered according to
the merits of my letter of lawsuit.
Budapest,
20th May, 2003.
Dr
György Ádám
plaintiff
I shall send a copy of the present
submission to the legal representative of the defendant.