Interpretation of section 269 of the 4th Act of 1978

of the Criminal Punitive Code

 

I.

 

The story of section 269 Incitement to hatred against a community

of the Penal Code

 

 

            During its twenty-five-year long history, the Incitement to hatred against a community  (CC 269. §) has had many interesting things happen to it. The currently effective CC took effect on 1st July, 1979 (section 1 of 5th Act of 1979.). At this time the passage in question was codified in Chapter X of the CC (first chapter of Special passage) under crimes against the state, in section 148, with the title Incitement and with the following text:

            148. § (1) Whoever, before others, in order to incite hatred against

a)      the Hungarian nation, or some other nationality,

b)      the constitutional order of the People's Republic of Hungary,

c)      the international alliances, friendships, or cooperations or any other international relations of the People's Republic of Hungary,

d)      some people, congregation or race, or certain groups or persons – for their Socialist convictions – commits an act, is to be sentenced to one to five years of imprisonment.

(2) The sentence is to be imprisonment of two to eight years, if

a)      the incitement was committed before the wider public, or as a member of a group,

b)      the incitement leads to the disruption of the international relations of the People's Republic of Hungary as set down in points c)-d) of paragraph (1).

(3) Whoever makes preparations for incitement as defined in point a) of paragraph (2) is to be sentenced to two years imprisonment, or in times of war, to one to five years imprisonment.

 

            Therefore originally, this legal case was entered amongst the most serious crimes (crimes against the state). A very similar legal codification was set down in Chapter XVI., section 269 on Crimes against Public Order (Injuring a community), the following way:

            „269. § (1) Whoever, before others, in order to incite hatred against

a)  the Hungarian nation, or some other nationality,

b)  the constitutional order of the People's Republic of Hungary,

c)      the international alliances, friendships, or cooperations or any other international relations of the People's Republic of Hungary,

d)      some people, congregation or race, or certain groups or persons – for their Socialist convictions – commits an act, is to be sentenced to one to five years of imprisonment.

(2) Whoever employes an injurious or degrading expression, or commits any such act before others against the Hungarian nation, the constitutional order of the People's Republic of Hungarian, furthermore – because of their nationality, faith, race or socialist convictions – groups or persons, is to be sentenced to one year's imprisonment, or corrective labour, or a fine for said criminal actions.

(3) Whoever commits the crime determined in paragraphs (1) or (2) as a member of a group, or before the wider public, will be sentenced to up to three-year's imprisonment for the crime, or up to two-year's imprisonment for the misdemeanor.

 

As it becomes apparent from the quoted items of law, INCITEMENT was not a legal situation in the original wording, and neither was it one in other passages of law.

The two – above quoted – legal situations were united, when section 269 of Chapter XVI, the Incitement Against a Community was merged with the currently effective paragraph (1) and the since then repealed paragraph (2) of the 25th Act of 1989 (to amend the Penal Code).

 

II.

Interpretation of the justification of section 269.

 

The legislator provided detailed justification for the currently effective section 269 entitled Incitement Against a Community – in my opinion – often illegally, in self-contradictory manner, primarily referring to the justifications of the Constitutional Court's (AB) rulings. It is generally known, however, that the justifications of AB rulings are not binding, they are merely a part of the ruling. I shall analyse the passage in question by following this train of thought.

The justification of the law says: In order to clarify this case precisely, it is inevitable that freedom of expression of opinion and incitement to hatred be unequivocally and clearly separated, and therefore a position must be adopted in the question of where the boundary is that recognisably separates incitement against a community from the constitutional right of freedom of expression. The freedom of speech and opinion, and its safeguarding with legal means, is one of the most crucial basic pillars of every democratic state, and this has been set down in Hungarian law with regard to and in keeping with international norms.

It is indubitable that one of the most important tasks of interpretation of the law is

–        clearly and

–        unequivocally

to separate the freedom of expression and incitement to hatred. Therefore, indeed, a position must be adopted on where the BOUNDARY is, which RECOGNISABLY separates incitement against a community from the constitutional right of expression of opinion, which is inevitable in every independent democratic state of law.

            Thus I agree with this statement of the justification: Based on this, it can be asserted that an opinion may be freely expressed as long as it does not mutate into incitement to hatred. This then means that the legal situation determined in paragraph (1) of section 269 of the Penal Code cannot provide a special protection from prosecution for the expression of injurious, hurtful, possibly humiliating opinions.

            The related international legal interpretation is also correct.

            The justification of the interpretation of section 269 of the Penal Code henceforth markedly deviates from the correct principles reffered to so far, when it cites the following: The Constitutional Court provided guidelines for the interpretation and practical application of the above in its 30/1992. (V.26.) AB ruling. It must definitely be noted that from the point of view of incitement against a community a substantial narrowing of criminal liability has taken place, and the legal situation comprises only the most dangerous behaviours, those behaviours, as a result of which the Penal Code can only be employed as a final resort, when public peace, the order of society and peace are really threatened.” (Extract of the 1992 ruling justification of the AB.)

            Firstly, I would like to emphasise the section of the statement, according to which the AB provided guidelines for the

 

–        interpretation and

–        practical application

of the piece of legislation.

            However section 1 of Chapter I of the 32nd Act of 1989, which determines the authority of the Constitutional Court, does not include the interpretation of acts, only the interpretation of the orders of the Constitution (point g of section 1 of AB Act). Thus the AB has the right to interpret the effective legislation in the justification of its rulings, but it is not a GUIDELINE, but one of many interpretations. The justification, however, cites this as if – de jure – the interpretation were binding. This breach of the law leads to – what I shall henceforth refer to as – the misinterpretation of section 269 of the Penal Code.

            The AB interpretation, which resulted in a SUBSTANTIAL NARROWING of criminal liability suggests that the AB Judges – and thus the prosecutors and Courts applying the law – were not aware of Hungary's thousand-year history. The reader of the justification notes with astonishment that those involved treat the legal interpretration as if Hungary had been set up not in the year thousand, but in two thousand. They simply forget about a thousand years, or they simply pretend that in this historical period no SUCCESSFUL incitement to hatred had been achieved. Over a thousand years, however, Hungarian Jews were practically constantly DISCRIMINATED against. As early as in 1092 King László I brought the first Jewish law, after this – primarily as a result of the incitement of Christian priests - 39 (THIRTY-NINE!) Jewish laws were in effect, and between 1938 and early May 1945 (some one million) Hungarian citizens – regarded and qualified by others as Jewish – were murdered in death camps, forced to wear distinguishing marks, the star of David, yellow armbands and became free prey to the anti-Semitic aristocracy, the riff-raff, gendarmes and arrow-cross bandits. All this was the result of constant incitement to anti-Semitic hatred! May I note that in Kunmadaras pogroms continued against Jews in 1946, but some sport supporter hooligans to this day continue to incite hatred, which is intensifying in this world – held ransom by terrorists.

In this current global situation – which threatens 6.3 billion people (the whole population of the Earth) – the REALISTIC THREAT to public peace is very much present with a centre in Israel, thus the substantial narrowing of criminal liability to protect all citizens – deemed Jewish by others – is an illegal interpretation of the law. I do agree that it extends only to the most dangerous behaviours, but nowadays – with reference to Hungarian Jews – this most dangerous historical situation is present. It is a fundamental principle of criminal law that the interpretation of laws created to protect those threatened, possibly in mortal danger, cannot be narrowed, but the freedom of expression of the inciter to hatred is to be restricted, which means that the reciprocal interpretation of the AB 1992 interpretation is viable.

Furthemore, the justification of section 269 of the Penal Code says: …the freedom of expression of opinion has a special role amongs fundamental Constitutional rights, therefore the state may only use the means of restricting this fundamental right, if it is indispensable to the assertion of another fundamental right and freedom, or constitutional value, and the restriction itself complies with the requirement of proportionate measures. The incitement to hatred, marked as behavioural commission in paragraph (1) of section 269 of the Penal Code threatens fundamental rights, which are very highly valued in the Constitutional order, and the resultant threat gives such weight to public peace, determined as its direct subject, with regard to which, according to the position of the Constitutional Court, the restruction of the freedom of expression of opinion is necessary and proportionate. (underlining by Gy Á) The here quoted justification extract is in conflict with the formerly quoted passage, as the AB notes herein that incitement to hatred set down in section 269 threatens fundamental rights which are VERY HIGHLY VALUED in the Constitutional order, therefore it gives the public peace, which it determined as the DIRECT SUBJECT, such weight, which justifies this necessary and PROPORTIONATE restriction on the expression of opinion.

For the reasons detailed above, it cannot be contested that the restriction of all incitement to hatred against Hungarian Jews is NECESSARY and PROPORTIONATE because of the crimes committed against Jews (discrimination, ghetto, pogroms, mass murders, etc.) through the thousand years of Hungarian history. To narrow this is in itself anti-Semitic incitement! It is not clear, however, what the justification means under determined as direct subject. What does direct mean in this context? If it means what today's appliers of the law (certain Judges and prosecutors) undertsand it to mean, than it is a seriously illegal interpretation. There is no directness in history. Jews, for example, according to the New Testament (St Paul's letter to the Romans) all Jews – including those to be born – are responsible, as long as Jews exist, for the crucifixion of Jesus Where is the directness in this interpretation – which is an interpretation accepted throughout the world? In this interpretation even two thousand years are directly determined.

            This narrowing in the justification forecasts the interpretation of the crime of threatening – thus immaterial crime – as a material crime – thus the result-crime interpretation of section 269 of the Penal Code, which I shall discuss in detail later.

 

 

III.

A reinterpretation of incitement against a community.

 

            The justification continues to explain: However the Constitutional Court emphasised that rules of material criminal law must be restricted to the narrowest possible path necessary to achieve the goal, and must clearly express the legislative's intent, which thus sets an obstacle to arbitrary interpretations. I believe that this is the arbitrary interpretation of the law. I could not agree more that with every legal interpretation – including that of incitement to hatred – an obstacle must be set to arbitrariness. However, the justification fails to set an obstacle to this very thing, and uses an extremely ARBITRARY justification! It says the following: The Constitutional Court explained in its ruling 36/1994. (VI. 24.) AB that There is no democratic society without pluralism, the freedom of expression of opinion is one of the cornerstones of a democratic society, one of the conditions of its evolution. This freedom is to be granted to thoughts, information, principles and tenets, which are hurtful, astonishing or cause anxiety. (underlining by Gy Á)

            Now let us observe the types of thoughts, information, principles, tenets and opinions, which are – according to the non-binding justification of the AB ruling – entitled to freedom of expression as one of the cornerstones of a democratic society? These are:

–        hurtful

–        astonishing, or

–        cause anxiety.

The first two opinions listed are indeed not to be criticised in a democratic society, but the third – the ones causing anxiety should be allowed to be expressed? Naturally the ones causing anxiety – without qualification – cause disturbance, because, for instance the inciter to hatred may be anxious if they realise that his behaviour may be punished by incarceration. Yet  this interpretation disturbs legal interpretation. Because generally it is not understood as causing anxiety to criminals, but to the incitement of the inciter of hatred,  for instance exclude them, because if you won't, they will do it you (naturally, the Christian priest's letter to the Christian Hungarian State refers to the Jews). This arouses great anxiety in all Hungarian Jews, because it refers to that continuance of law of a thousand years, which discriminated – in some way – against Hungarian Jews in Hungary, often discriminated them out of their lives.  I ask: why is the Christian priest eligible to arouse anxiety in Hungarian Jews with his letter addressed to the Christian Hungarian State? This is a rabulistic manner of expanding on the interpretation and application of the law, thus it is illegal, and inappropriate.

 

IV.

 

Separating incitement and incitement to hatred.

 

The justification says: Incitement and incitement to hatred cannot be interpreted as synonim terms in daily life. (With which I agree.)

Let me then ask: Why is section 269 of the Penal Code – on incitement to hatred – called Incitement Against a Community? This can only be understood after a historical account (it took the place of a previous passage), but grammatically, in terms of logics and sytsems – these are the means of legal interpretation – it is incomprehensible. It is suitable however, to mislead those less versed in law, which cannot be allowed in a democratic state of law. Yet I do not recommend an amendment of the wording of the law, I simply propose that lay people are properly informed in order to avoid misunderstandings.

This reasoning – by way of explanation – is supplemented with: Incitement is such a public expression of thought, which form a knowledge and emotions about a certain phenomenon, and thus sometimes causes to arouse passions in the psyche of others. While incitement can manifest itself through a series of rational arguments, and convictions against phenomena regarded as the general system of values of a society, in the case of incitement to hatred – which is synonymous with provocation and agitation – these criteria are generally completely missing. Incitement – as a notion denoting intolerant behaviour – has a negative moral connotation in public speech, as the inciter disturbs the existing peace, spurs others to enraged passion against someone or something. Incitement is such a statement, or series of statement, which were made primarily not for thoroughly considered, rational, conscious reasons, but out of passion, attempting to incite a hurtful manifestation of primary instincts. The inciter does not address reason, but appeals to base instincts, hopes to have an effect on others' emotions by whipping up passions, in the knowledge that the thus aroused hostile emotions could errupt and become uncontrollable. Hatred is a fierce hostile emotion, which contains dense negative passion, which is without reasonable consideration and unable to compare facts and arguments, or to weigh these objectively, it turns on its target with an erruption of great emotional upheaval. (underlining by Gy Á)

This separation clearly indicates that incitement to hatred and its synonyms (agitation, provocation) indeed cause anxiety – and, as more often than not the incitement is directed against Jews – and often conducive to fear for one's life. It must be noted emphatically that this section of the justification is unacceptable with an interpretation of logic: it consciously confuses form and content. It is completely irrational, therefore illogical, to interpret incitement as primarily not for thoroughly considered, rational, conscious reasons, but out of passion...hopes to have an effect on others' emotions...without reasonable consideration... The incitement described here is only one – and not even the most dangerous – form of incitement. Incitement can be thoroughly considered, rational and may appeal to the reason of others. This form of incitement is more effective when exercised on homo sapiens, then the not considered incitement – appealing only to emotions. The justification's series of statements – defining incitement – are arbitrary, unproven, an unacceptable definition in the world of rational men, therefore it is a seriously illegal NARROWING of the notion of incitement, which defines this  crime. Incitement to hatred against Jewry (to death camps, the murder of 600,000 Jews) was a consequence of the incitement to hatred between 1938 and 9th May, 1945. The primary INCITEMENTS were the Jewish laws and their ministerial justifications – uttered at the time – but not unconsidered texts lacking rational thought. Kálmán Darányi, Count Pál Teleky, Béla Imrédi, László Bárdosy were cultured people, who used logical sentences, and over eight years with their seemingly logical arguments they convinced the – otherwise cultured – Hungarian population (eg. university teachers) to turn against Jews, the circa one million citizens, regarded as Jews, could not have otherwise been murdered or hounded to the brink of death in a matter of months. Szálasi's six months of reign would not have been enough for this. Evidently, it is the result of this erroneous, one-side justification which accounts for the fact that the Budapest City Court, which acquitted the defendant Loránt Hegedűs, Jr for lack of crime, wrote the following of his article Christian Hungarian State! in its binding ruling    3.Bf.111/2003/10.: …previously developed, carefully constructed written, then recorded speech which was then broadcast over the radio… (Court of Appeals verdict page 6. paragraph 2, lines 2.-4.) Evidently the Court included in its illegal verdict of acquittal the elements of logical construction, because it believed that if the writing is not confused, is not without rational consideration – following the justification of section 269 of the Penal Code – it is no longer a crime. The acquittal was – for this simple reason – justified. (See extract from 1940 manual on incitement to hatred against Jews, which is a rationally considered incitement, addressed to the intellect of the gendarmes.

The justification seeks to transform section 269 of the Penal Code, which is immaterial – therefore requires no effect – law, fully implemented, final, into material, or effect-crime. It writes: Whoever thus incites to hatred against certain groups of people before the wide public, does not merely share their misgivings, unfavourable or hurtful opinions, their astonishing, or perhaps even anxiety causing thoughts and principles with others in a manner suitable to stir emotions, but – as it transpires from the sentencing precedents in compliance with the requirements of a state of law – displays such provocative behaviour which stirs tensions and is suitable to fire up emotions in a larger group of pepole to such an extent that could result in the incitement of hatred and thus the disruption of peace, social order and harmonic and tolerant human relationships.

My note: according to the justification, an inciter to hatred is one who

–        stirs tensions

–        displays provocative behaviour,

which are SUITABLE

–        in A LARGER GROUP OF PEOPLE

–        to FIRE UP EMOTIONS to such an extent,

–        that could result in the incitement of hatred

and thus

–        the disruption of social order and

–        peace and harmonic and tolerant human relationships.

 

Let me note the following fact: in this country – based on legal continuance of a thousand years – it is not hard to incite hatred against Jews in Hungary's hooligans, bandits, neonazis and other anti-Semites. A single displeasing sentence in a rarely listened-to radio is enough to bring thousands of people to gather and chant anti-Semitic slogans, then burn an Israeli flag. These hateful people await the next speech or article inciting against Jews, and immediately take action. This is the experience of a thousand years, but especially of the period between 1920 and 9th May, 1945. This passion is the most easily stirred up.

Based on all this, I strongly note that this legal situation's – illegal and unjustified EXTENSION – with elements, which are far beyond the intents of the law – and thus that of the legislators – is a false interpretation. The illegal extension of this legal situation narrows the codified text to such a degree that it makes hte establishing of the commission of a crime virtually impossible. It is generally known in legal interpretation that extending the elements of the legal situation narrows the behaviours that fall under the item of law. An increased number of elements in a legal situation results in a substantial drop in the number of cases falling under it: the number of elements of a legal situation are in reciprocal relationship with the number of behaviours falling under its authority. If the legislator's intent had been to incorporate these elements into section 269 of the Penal Code, they would have done so and would not have allowed the judiciary to apply an arbitrary interpretation of the law! It is, by the way, true – as it is written in the justification – that these arbitrarily included elements are in compliance with sentencing precedents... but why? Evidently because the justification and the justifications of certain AB rulings have forced these arbitrarily composed – and completely unwarranted by the text of the law – on the Judges. It is not hard to convince some Judges – with an illogical interpretation of the law – to bring fewer and fewer guilty verdicts, because thus they can simplify sentencing, without regard to the fact that thus they render the lives of certain communities completely impossible, foring them to live in fear – created by criminals.

I do, however agree with what the justification finally concludes: In order to meet the conditions of the commission of the crime it suffices for the inciter to be aware of the fact that their statements before the wider public are directed against a protected group, are suitable for the incitement of hatred, and their behaviour is motivated precisely by the former, they want to incite hatred and foresee that hatred may be incited, and accept this circumstance. This part of the justification, however – indicating that the crime is an immaterial one – is in conflict with the whole argument that went before.

 

 

V.

 

Incitement to hatred and prosecution.

 

            A striking example to this illegal narrowing of the crime, seen in sentencing precedents is the Budapest City Court's 3. Bf.111/2003/10. verdict dated 6th November 2003 -  acquitting the defendants – of which I wrote my study Notices, which I have attached. I also attach my study What does the term Jewish mean?, to which I attach the 1940 explanation to the Jewish law, written for the Hungarian Royal Gendarmerie.

            One should also attach the analysis of another article. Dávid Trencsényi's Who's bothered, an interview cum study was published on pages 25 and 26 of the political weekly 168 óra on 30th September, 2004.

           

The article includes the following: The reprint nazism of the thirties-forties serves the business interests of the editor-in-chief of the weekly and Magyar Ház Alapítvány owner András Bencsik. In his twenty shops around the country he sells the Gede publications. Before the time the mills of the judiciary begin their slow grind, private persons have lost their patience. In 2002 they attracted the attention of the 9th District prosecutor's office to an advert published in Magyar Fórum and urged officials to peruse freely the recommended literature. The investigation – in this instance for incitement against a community – was carried out by the Budapest Police Force (BRFK), which concluded the investigation with a proposal to bring charges. The district prosecution, however, did not want to place a burden on the Courts, and for lack of commission of a crime it terminated the proceedings – in a non-binding ruling.  The lengthy justification lists the contents of the publications named in the report. Although it notes that all of them contain anti-Semitic and racist texts, but they do not incite to violent actions, thus do not constitute incitement under the Penal Code. We asked our contact at the prosecutor's office: is Hungarian law really so effect-oriented? Does spouting of nazi hatred only constitute incitement, if it is followed by Jew beatings? The answer: yes. We noted that the now infamous Hungarist Diána Bácsfi told us earlier that for her the texts published by the Gede brothers are her spiritual food. The counterargument is unchanged: if there is no beating, there was no incitement. The private persons making the original report raised criticism against the district prosecutor's office's ruling at the Budapest Prosecutor's Office.  We asked the prosecutor who countersigned the appeal to tell us how it was possible to interpret the statement the solution to the evil of Jews is the destruction of the intruders  as anything other than incitement to hatred. The prosecutor was bound by law: she was unable to comment on a case in progress. The charge offers dozens of pages of detailed descriptions of the contents of the publications, point out the incitements. 'What can the prosecution hope for, if according to sentencing precedents the charge of incitement will not be upheld without physical violence committed,' we asked the spokeswoman. (page 26.)

These descriptions, the position of prosecutors show it as evident that the judiciary regards section 269 of the Penal Code – a crime of endangerment, and the crime is committed with the posing of the threat even if it has no effects – as a material or effect-oriented crime. It is hard to imagine a greater, more shameful legal practice, on the basis of the thousand-year old legal continuance of the Christian Hungarian State, in an independent democratic state of law in the third millennium.

It is beyond doubt that this sentencing precedent employed by the Courts and adhered to by the prosecutor's offices is political anti-Semitism, which is forbidden by paragraph 3 of section 50, and paragraph (2) of section 53 of the Constitution, and is a seriously unconstitutional behaviour.

            STEPS MUST BE TAKEN, but without proposals to amend the legislation. The Act is good, but its application is dismaying.

 

                                                                      

                                                                       Dr György Ádám

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Hungarian Royal Minister for the Interior has issued the 50.630/eln. VI. c. 1937. statutory instrument on 10th June 1937, by which it ordered this work as supplementary training material for the Hungarian Royal Gendarmerie.

A PRACTICAL MANUAL TO HUNGARIAN CRIMINAL LAW FOR THE HUNGARIAN ROYAL GENDARMERIE. Compiled and explained by: Dr. ÁGOST MISKOLCZY deputy royal attorney general, ZOLTÁN PINCZÉS Colonel of the Hungarian Royal Gendarmerie BUDAPEST 1940.

 

Criminal acts under the law restricting public and economic presence of Jews. (1939: IV. t.-c.)

 

            The strength of the nation is determined not only by its economic and military might but also by the intensity of its national and racial self-awareness. Thus was the process launched around the world, which, aiming to develop and reinforce the moral factors of the nations, endeavour to destroy and exclude from the life of the nation any damaging elements, which strive to obscure, neutralise or weaken national and racial self-awareness.

            Today the recognition is spreading around the world that Jewry is a peculiar group of people, separate from all other peoples. In spite of its differences of provenance, its dispersement over a large area, it has lived for thousands of years in separation of all other peoples. United unto itself, self-reliant and yet international. The millennia-long separation of the Jews from the environment around them has resulted in their remaining alien within the body of the nation that tolerates them as guests, and if some of them show some attempts to assimilate, the entirety of Jewry will remain in its racial isolation. The Jews living in Hungary have only been able to assimilate in external features, but in their emotions, attitudes, morals, in its position taken in the face of the Hungarian national destiny, etc, they remain Jews, even though Jews have lived in Hungary for centuries, and even though the majority of Jews living here do not even speak a language other than Hungarian.

            Jew feels more kinship towards Jew, than towards the other inhabitants of the country. The capital held primarily by Jew, has provided more efficient assistance to the Jewish businessman than to the Hungarian businessman, as a result of which the latter had to compete with his Jewish rival at more unfavourable conditions. This racial unity of Jewry, but especially their web of interests running through the country's economic life has resulted in that incomes and national wealth are disproportionately held by the Jewry. Through their wealth and peculiar characteristics the Jews now have control of the press, the theatre, Arts and literature, in other words the very things, which are the most significant in terms of influencing the public opinion of a country. The purposeful use of these has granted Jewry often deciding, although concealed influence in matters of state and social issues.

            The separate race, morals of Jewry, and the resultant view of the world and behaviour, and its tenacious endeavour to influence the public opinion of the nations as dictated by Jewish interests, causes great disadvantages to the national societies, and, where the proportion of the Jewish population is great, it poses a grave threat. Therefore states, which express the thought of national community in all their institutions – such as Italy or Germany –, were forced to bar Jewry's exaggerated expansion by the means of legislation, moreover to completely bar Jewry from the life of the nation.

Hungary, in terms of the proportion of its Jewish population, is the third in Europe, it is natural therefore that it would have been impossible for her to remain unconcerned by the threats posed by Jewry. The Hungarian state took its first step to restrict Jewry with the 1938: XV. t.-c. This Act has established the proportion of representation of Jewry in public life at 20 per cent, four times their proportion within the nation. Jews, however, whilst the authorities were compiling numbers in this respect, offered false statements in order to counteract and escape the measures of the law. Thus the state was forced to implement regulations more stringent than those set down in Act 1933: XV. t.-c. Thus was the 1939: IV. t.-c. born.

The main regulations set down by the Act are the following:

1. It determines who is to be regarded as Jewish. Unlike the term Jewish, which denotes belonging to the Jewish people, Israelite denotes those who are Jews, but not all Jews are of the Israelite religious. There are Jews of Christian faith: those, who converted to Christianity, but under the law must be regarded as Jewish.

2. Within the definition of Jews, the Act determines two groups: a wider group, which is to fall under every regulation of the Act, and a narrower group, to which it offers some exemptions, in that certain aspects of the law are not applicable to them, and rules that certain less stringent regulations are to be applied to them. The latter includes primarily those Jews who have earned individual honours from the point of view of the Hungarian nation – eg. in the war, under revolutions or communism.

3. Jews cannot earn Hungarian citizenship through naturalisation, marriage or legalisation. Measures made so far to naturalise Jews may be reviewed.

      4. The Act limits the participation of Jews in the legislative, in the areas of policing and local authority councils, and in the exercising of related political rights.

      5. Jews cannot hold public office.

      6. Jews may account for no more than 6 per cent of those admitted to the first year of a college or university, and they may account for no more than 12 per cent of those admitted to the department of economics at the universities of engineering and economics.

      7. A maximum of 6 per cent of lawyers, engineers, doctors or actors may be Jewish, and a maximum of 15 per cent of journalists – including those under exemption – may be Jewish.

      8. Jews may not participate in the intellectual or artistic direction of regular or non-regular printed press products (eg. dailies or weeklies), theatres or film companies.

      9. Jews may not receive licences from authorities (eg. pharmacist's, publican's, tobacconist's, cinema manager's licences).

10. Jewish businesses may account for no more than 6 per cent of the value of a public procurement deal.

11. The proportion of Jews holding business permits and licences may not exceed 6 per cent in any community. Jews holding permits and licences at the time of the law taking effect will not be stripped of their permits and licences – unless extraordinary circumstances arise – but in communities where Jewish permit- and licence-holders exceed 6 per cent, Jews may not be issued with such permits and licences until their proportion drops below 6 per cent.

12. Jews may purchase agricultural or wooded land only at auctions, from private owners and only in possession of official permits.

13. Jewish officials and assistants and their revenues at private businesses (eg. industrial, commercial or agricultural businesses) may not exceed 15 per cent, including those exempted under point 2. (Foreign nationals may only be employed to fill vacant positions with a permit issued by the relevant Minister.)

14. Jews may not be members of the executive committee or officers of workers' clubs, workers' organisations or employment agencies.

15. Finally the Act provides authorisation to the Government to assist the emmigration of Jews from the country.

The Act orders the punishment of those who breach the above regulations. Relevant punitive measures are listed below: