Budapest

Markó u. 16.

1055

Dear Chairman,

I request that under point b) of paragraph (2) of section 64 of the 67^th Act of 1997 on the legal position and remuneration of Judges (henceforth Bj.tv.) Supreme Court (LB) Judge Dr Mátyás Mészáros (judge at LB Pf, and Pfv IV councils) be submitted to a disciplinary procedure for the disciplinary breach determined in point a) of section 63 of the Bj.tv., because the said Judge breached his obligations arising from his status.

R e a s o n i n g :

I tendered a lawsuit on 20^th January, 2003 to the Pest County Central District Court (PKKB) againsts the defendant Loránt Hegedűs, Jr, for the contents of his article published on the front page of the 16^th District MIÉP paper Ébresztő's 3^rd issue of the 3^rd year in 2001 with the title Christian Hungarian State!, as it calls for discrimination against all Jews living in Hungary, which is a demand of hostile action against those named. Because I – along with my entire family – was discriminated against sixty years ago (star of David, labour camp, yellow armband, ghetto, transportation to death camp in Kőszeg, gas chamber, being shot to death, starved to death, etc.) I set it down that the repeated call to discrimination refers without exception TO EVERY HUNGARIAN JEW, THEREFORE under paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code, I assert my personal rights personally. I did not ask anything else in my petition, than that the Court determine that under point a) of paragraph (1) of section 84 of the Civil Code that my personal rughts were breached, and to forbid the defendant from further breach of the law. I requested nothing else, not even trial costs. This – I believe – is the absolute minimum that a citizen, gravely injured in his personal rights, can demand of the Court.

At first degree I won the lawsuit – in a good-quality verdict. The defendant lodged an appeal.

The Court of Appeals was the Budapest City Court's (F.B.) Pf. 52. council, which referred to trial law form, and rejected my lawsuit in a binding verdict.

I submitted a 16-page request of review on 26^th March, 2004. providing a detailed argument of the justification of my request, on the basis of section 270 of the Pp – precisely citing the 105^th Act of 2001 amending section 270 – and of the illegality of the verdict in the appeal. In my 16-page request of review I reiterated a – detailed – analysis of why I am affected by the defendant's article, which INJURED ME DIRECTLY.

I emphasised this in my request of review, because I believed – and continue to believe today – that the Court of Appeals did not understand the essence of why I was personally affected (they got bogged down in what is one of the most dangerous practices of delivering verdicts by taking precedents for granted automatically, schematically and without thorough deliberation). For all these reasons I used 53 (fifty-three) arguments over nine chapters in my request of review to PROVE my being personally affected by the defendant's writing.

My request of review was turned down by Judge Dr Mátyás Mészáros on 25^th May, 2004, in the ruling Pfv.E.21.020/2004/2. Thus the case – by res iudicata, de jure – was finally closed. I acknowledge this on the bass of section 7 of the 66^th Act of 1997 on the Organisation and management of Courts (Bszi.tv.). I have no further demands with reference to the civil lawsuit, which I lost following a binding verdict. I would like to note, however, that should the Supreme Court – under its own authority – having appraised itself of the illegal ruling – as a result of a disciplinary hearing – retract the ruling, which, I believe, it has the right to do, I would be grateful.

The reason of my submitting a request against Dr Mátyás Mészáros to the Chairman: it cannot be denied that the ruling is a result of his political activities. His ruling has – whether unintentionally – provided assistance to hatred aimed at discriminating against Hungarian Jews. The ruling is therefore, objectively, not a judicial writ, but a political statement. I am not aware of Judge Dr Mátyás Mészáros's political conviction, and it is far from me to suggest that he was subjectively so motivated. The activity (this is the wording of the legal situation in both the Constitution and the Bj.tv.) is objective, entirely independent of its subjective purpose; an activity motivated by good intents may be objectively harmful, and an activity motivated by negative intents could also be – irrespective of the aim – objectively correct Which is why I claim that the activity of the Judge making the ruling served political purposes, even if that was not his subjective aim.

Thus Dr Mátyás Mészáros unintentionally breached the second passage of the second sentence of paragraph (3) of section 50 of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary (Judges... cannot engage in political activities), and Judges' obligations set down in Bj.tv. Chapter II (The Rights and Obligations of Judges) paragraph (1) of section 22: Professional judges... may not engage in political activities.

My pieces of evidence to prove that the ruling – in spite of all its good intents – is not only a Court ruling, but also a political writing:

1.) The ruling says: In the request of review, in compliance with the above, a precise and specific note is to be made of the facts, on the basis of which the requester holds the binding verdict to be in conflict with the law, and why and to what extent this has affected the evaluation of the merits of the case, furthermore the note must extend to which passage of paragraph (2) of section 270 of the PP the request of review is to be based on. On the basis of the issues raised in the request of review, it cannot be determined that the binding verdict was in conflict with the law. (final paragraph page 2, first paragraph, and first sentence of paragraph three of page three).

The truth however is, that I wrote the following in the introduction to my request of review: I, Dr György Ádám, plaintiff, submit the following r e q u e s t o f r e v i e w against the binding verdict 52.Pf.29.063/2003/4. delivered by the Budapest City Court as Court of Appeals on 26^th February, 2004, and delivered to me on 5^th March, 2004, in the lawsuit against Loránt Hegedűs, Jr, defendant, based on paragraph (1) of section 270 of the Code of Civil Lawsuit (Pp) – regarding that, under paragraph (2) of the Pp, the verdict is in conflict with the law, furthermore, under the contents of point b) of paragraph (2) of section 270 of the Pp a review of the verdict is necessary for the further development of legal practices, and under subordinated point ba.) a theoretical legal question has been raised, and the Supreme Court has as yet not taken a decision in the matter through an announcement made in the official compilation of the Supreme Court's rulings. (first paragragp, first page). My submission – in contrast with the declaration of the ruling – was entirely in compliance with the requirements set down by Judge Dr Mátyás Mészáros. I noted that the review of the verdict was necessary, as set down in point b) of paragraph (2) of section 270 of the PP, to further develop legal ruling practices, as, under subordinated point ba.) a theoretical legal question has arisen with regard to the ruling, and the Supreme Court has yet to take a decision in the matter, and list it in the official compilation of its rulings. Thus I precisely noted WHICH PASSAGE of paragraph (2) of section 270 of the PP I intended to base the request of review on. To note the omission thereof, is a false claim.

Judge Dr Mátyás Mészáros said the following in the ruling: The binding verdict beyond the above is in keeping with the 2002/2/740 ruling set down in the compilation of the Supreme Court's rulings, under which legal protection of personal rights may only be exercised if the activity declared as illegal may be brought into direct connection with a specific person.” (ruling, lines 9-15, paragraph 3, page 3.)

The ruling thus states two facts one after the other:

a.) In my request of review I failed to refer to the requirements set down in the section (2) of paragraph 207 of the Pp, amended by the 105^th Act of 2001. In my letter of lawsuit, my notes, my counterappeal and in my request of review I provided itemised evidence in keeping with the rules of interpretation of the law to prove that the defendant's calls to exclusion of Hungarian Jews referred to EVERY person residing here and regarded as Jewish, therefore there is no need for further proof that it then refers to me too – a Hungarian resident, regarded by others as Jewish. Everyone includes every single person. This is a fundamental rule of grammatical intepretation in legal interpretation, but is in keeping with the rules of logic, systems and interpretation of history. This means that Judge Dr Mátyás Mészáros failed to consider the rules of interpretation of the law.

b.) BEYOND THE ABOVE the Judge writes – therefore irrespectively of the contents of the previous point – the request is in keeping with the legal instance no. 740 of no2. of the 2002 official compilation of the Supreme Court's rulings.

ad a.) The statement of the ruling is not in keeping with the truth, because – as I proved – my submission was in compliance with every requirement of the 105^th Act of 2001.

ad b.) The cited no. 740 of no2. of the 2002 compilation (L.B. Pfv.20.118/2001.) cannot be applied to the contents of my submission. The published theoretical ruling was in connection with the name given to a toilet paper factory, which was the family name of the plaintiff, and therefore refers to the protected personal rights set down in section 76 of the Civil Code, which is light years away from the contents of my letter of lawsuit. It cannot be required of the plaintiff to engage in guesswork and to take a completely different case as a basis, which is said to be referring to the legal situation of incitement ot hatred. With this method, the requester of review is forced to leave it up to the luck of the draw, as to which theoretical decision would be referred to by the single Supreme Court Judge acting in the case, but without possibility of appeal. With this method, the given Judge deciding whether the request of review is meritorious, forces the party planning to present a request of review to carefully read through the hundreds of theoretical decisions taken by the Supreme Court in Hungary, and to take a haphazard decision on whether he has found an – extisting ruling – which is in any way similar to the request of review he is planning to submit. If he finds a theoretical decision, which, in some sentences, is similar to the one he is planning to submit, he is better off not submitting one at all, because – now, beyond any further opportunity to make legal amends – the single Judge decides arbitrarily whether to classify the case as one for which a theoretical decision has already been passed by the Supreme Court (eg. the case of the toilet paper and the plaintiff's family name is such a – non-sueable – theoretical decision, which determines that the person fearing discrimination, and directly affected, cannot sue on the basis of a res iudicata ruling passed by a single Judge: the Verdict is the end of a legal case in the judiciary of an EU-member independent democratic state of law.

Let me note that the review verdict in the cited case was made by the Pfv.IV council, of which Judge Dr Mátyás Mészáros is a member. Setting this Supreme Court ruling as a parallel with Loránt Hegedűs Jr calling for the exclusion of all Jews in Hungary (star of David, ghetto, death camp, gas chamber, etc.) is tasteless and illegal. Judge Dr Mátyás Mészáros regards THIS theoretical ruling, as a basis to prove that I failed to prove my being personally affected by the defendant's writing demanding the exclusion of Jews. The other ruling (L.B. Pfv. IV.20.249/2004/2.) WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE COMPILATION OF RULINGS, BUT THIS TOO WAS TAKEN BY THE COURT, WHICH HAS AS ITS MEMBER Judge Dr Mátyás Mészáros. This is his reasoning – and nothing else – to prove that I am not personally affected.

2.) Judgre Dr Mátyás Mészáros also states that the illegal nature of the binding verdict could not be established – on the basis of my request of review.

In my request of review I brought fifty-three arguments over nine chapters to prove that the binding verdict is illegal. It is the obligation of the Judge delivering the ruling to justify his rejection of my fifty-three arguments. Under the final passage of paragraph (1) of section 221 of the Pp …a reference must be made to the reasons, for which the Judge found all facts unproven… Although the quoted passage refers to the verdict, but inder paragraph (5) of section 273 of the Pp.: The acting Judge – should he reject the suit – will decide – WITH JUSTIFICATION ATTACHED. (capitalisation by GY Á) The Pp. orders the justification in section 221.

Judge Dr Mátyás Mészáros breached the Pp. when he did not provide a justification for his rejection of my 53 pieces of evidence listed over nine chapters. My arguments are so unequivocally convincing that they are IRREFUTABLE!

Finally the conclusion of the above: Because none of the legal statements of the ruling were – de jure – in compliance with the law or logics of law, and yet the ruling was delivered by Judge Mátyás Mészáros, it cannot objectively be regarded as anything other than political activity. I proved this above.

I state that – should a disciplinary hearing be launched under paragraph (1) of section 75 of Bj.tv. against Judge Dr Mátyás Mészáros for his objective political activities – I am available as a witness.

I apologise to Judge Dr Mátyás Mészáros for regarding his activity – in spite of his presumed subjective intents – as an objective political activity, but I cannot do otherwise when evaluating the legal dispute thus terminated. I do not ask for a hearing against Judge Dr Mátyás Mészáros because I lost the lawsuit – this is out of the question – but because this has – whether intentionally or not – a political content and supports the anti-Semitic extreme right in an EU-member independent democratic state of law, sixty years after the Holocaust, yet again forecasting the possibility of mortal dangers.

Dear Chairman,

I would like to note the following:

1.) The binding rejection shook me greatly, because I was flabbergasted to realise that there still exist Judges in the Hungarian judiciary of today, who do not deliver verdicts in keeping with the laws of an independent democratic state of law within the European Union. We, people regarded as Jewish – by others – tolerated like lambs to the slaughter that humanity's most shameful mass murder and chasing to the brink of death be committed against us between 1938 and the spring of 1945. We had not a word of protest against it. The result: the murder of 600.000 Jews in gas chambers, or by shooting into the Danube, and torture to the brink of death of 400,000 Hungarian citizens. This is once and for all over. This we shall not allow to happen once more to Hungarian citizens – regarded as Jews. We shall take every legal step against renewed calls to exclusion, which had happened before between 1938 and the spring of 1945. This could happen again because of the loathing of 6.2 billion Earth inhabitants, especially through such incitements by priests, and the assistance of some Judges. These Court decisions provide a boost to the extreme right to step up their hounding of Jews.

This incitement to hatred, and its written form will not remain simple words and text. I agree with Minister of Education Bálint Magyar, who wrote: Everything begins in words. (speech delivered at Auschwitz-Birkenau, published in FORUM section of Népszabadság on 15^th April, 2004.). We inherited this from the animal world, the beast roars before it strikes its prey. Animal roars tamed (or rather wildened) into speeches and written articles, such as the defendant's writing, in civilisation. A writing calling for discrimination will not remain an article, it will be followed by actions (perhaps action culminating in mass murder). Incitement to hatred – which a demand for discrimination obviously is – is not freedom of speech but a murderous attack on humanity. This cannot be looked upon without actions by the judiciary of an EU-member independent democratic state of law. THIS is not democracy, yet – unintentionally – these are helped by such Court rulings. This is why I take an emphatic step against Judge Dr Mátyás Mészáros's illegal ruling with my present submission.

I attach to the present submission my two scientific studies, which deal with such problems:

a.) Endgame of errors

b.) United and doubtful judiciary

I need to make the following supplementary statements:

The studies attached prove that Judges, who have once before taken a – binding – position (res iudacta) – in a past legal dispute – cannot take part in determining future verdicts for a conflict of interest. The present legal dispute – described by me – is further unequivocal evidence that my position is correct.

Both of my studies have already been published on the internet.

2.) The binding rejection of my lawsuit – however sad it makes me – is irrelevant to me. The demands in my lawsuit were so negligible that I feel empowered to decide which verdict or ruling is binding for me (not de jure, but de facto). I hold the first verdict to be binding, the others are immaterial to me.

3.) Let me inform you, Chairman, that I shall publish all trial documents (with all my evidence and all supplements ) – once this submission has also been evaluated – on the internet. I have agreed with a translator who will translate the entire body of text into English, and it will also be published on the internet. I am in negotiations with another translator, who will – this is as yet uncertain – translate the documents into German, and that version will also be made available on the internet. I am in talks with Yed Wasem – the Israeli Holocaust-researching insitute – and they are considering translating the whole material into Hebrew and publishing it on the internet.

I request that you take action, and to acknowledge my supplementary statements.

24^th June, 2004. Budapest.

Yours sincerely:

Dr György Ádám, plaintiff

doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences

professor of law at ELTE Department of Law

solicitor