Pesti Központi Kerületi Bíróság

Pest Central District Court.

Ref. no.: 20.P.85.346/2003.

Dr György Ádám plaintiff, in a lawsuit (number as above) against Loránt Hegedűs, Jr, defendant, for the breach of my personal rights set down in section 76 of the Civil Code, - acting in person, as set down in paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code – requested that a breach of law be established under point a) of paragraph (1) of section 84 of the Civil Code, and that the Court order the cessation of the illegal behaviour, as set down in point b). As a conclusion of the lawsuit, a Supreme Court Judge rejected my request of review at a Supreme Court hearing on 25^th May, 2004 and filed at the Pest Central District Court on 1^st June, 2004 under Pfv.E.21.020/2004/2.

Against the ruling, with reference to point a) of paragraph (1) of section 260 of the Pp – and a reference to paragraph (2) – I submit the following

p e t i t i o n f o r r e t r i a l

I request that – on the basis of my arguments detailed below – a trial is set as set down in paragraph (2) of section 266 of the Pp.

J u s t i f i c a t i o n :

Before an argument for the merits of the case, I feel it is necessary that I present a formal justification (of trial law) with my petition for retrial.

Paragraph (1) of section 260 of the Pp says the following: A petition for retrial may be submitted against a binding verdict of a.) the party refers ...to a fact or piece of evidence which the Court did not consider in the trial … (abbreviations by plaintiff).

The crucial element of the quoted passage is verdict. The term verdict however, as evidently it was the intent of the legislative, must be interpreted implicitly. This is revealed in the analysis of the issue in Chapter XIII (by István Novák) of Explanations to Trial Law (K.J.K. Budapest 1976.). It says: All trial amendments aim to make up for injuries suffered by a litigating party by means of the binding verdict delivered in the original hearing. The same is the case with a retrial. The injury suffered by the litigating party can lie in the establishing of a fact, in the application of law, or possibly in both at the same time.” (page 1187.) Then later: Under the Pp. a retrial is available against a binding verdict. This rule of law firstly means that a retrial is not available against a binding ruling. The reason for this is that in the system of the Pp. a verdict has the strength of material law, while rulings have no material strength of law. Therefore the alteration of facts established as a basis of the ruling, and thus the amendment of the ruling itself may be attempted through a new lawsuit, while a new lawsuit is not – only a petition of retrial is – suitable to challenge the facts established as a basis of a binding verdict (page 1189. underlining by author). Then, a paragraph later: A retrial is available against a Supreme Court ruling made in the matter of a review of legality, if the ruling takes the place of the verdict delivered by the Court in the first proceedings. It is true that paragraph (1) of section 260 uses the term ”verdict” when regulating the cases of retrial, this is however, a definition of the most common cases of retrial, but does not exclude the possibility of a retrial in the case if the verdict of the original Court is replaced by the ruling of the Supreme Court determining whether said verdict was legal. (pp. 1189.-1190, underlining by author).

The legal interpretation of the author – and related precedents – were right in establishing this. It is also generally known that a review of legality was replaced by review which – for lack of amendment of the word of the law – is subject to the same regulations, as the previous rulings. It follows that a retrial may be demanded against a – final, trial-closing – ruling of the Supreme Court (even if we call it a ruling) according to point a) of paragraph (1) of section 260 of the Pp. I made my petition for retrial on the basis of the above.

II.

I submitted my request of review, over 16 pages with nine chapters featuring fifty-three pieces of evidence, to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Hungary on 26^th March, 2004, with detailed formal and legal justification as set down in section 270 of the Pp., providing evidence to prove that the binding verdict was illegal.

1.) The seriously illegal – ruling, which forms a basis of the petition for retrial featured the following justification: On the basis of the contents of the request of review the illegality of the binding verdict cannot be established. The Court arrived at the conclusion that plaintiff's being personally affected by the defendant's actions could not be established on the basis of the correct interpretation of the stipulations of sections 75-85 of the Civil Code, and a correct interpretation of sentencing precedents, thus plaintiff did not suffer such a direct breach of his rights, which could justify his assertion of his personal rights under section 84 of the Civil Code. (age three, paragraph three, first two sentences).

My reply to the two sentences quoted – and intended as justification:

According to the contents of the request of review filed by me, the illegality of the binding verdict is clearly proven, the simple case is that the Judge who delivered the ruling did not even attempt to refute the facts cited by me, whereas under section 275/B of the Pp: Unless otherwise ordered by law, the Supreme Court will act in compliance with appropriate general regulations when conducting a procedure of review. The second sentence of paragraph (5) of section 273 of the Pp. says: The acting Judge shall decide on the request of review in a ruling – in case of rejection, with justification attached.

Regulations on rulings – which must include justification – delivered by the Court are set down in paragraph (1) of section 221 of the Pp. The final passage of the item of legislation in question: …finally a reference must be made to the reasons for which the Court found some facts unproven... (abbreviations by plaintiff). The legal situation thus – with reference to the ruling, which constitutes the final rejection – is that I presented facts in the course of the trial which served to prove primarily that as a result of the defendant's incitements to exclusion the plaintiff's being personally affected is unequivocally proven. I – the plaintiff – in my counterappeal and request of review listed such facts, which provide clear evidence to my being personally affected. It is not my fault that the Court of Appeals and that the Supreme Court Judge acting in the matter both ignored these pieces of evidence, and pretended that I had never even submitted or set said pieces of evidence in writing. Not to mention the fact that paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code – regulations on breach of personal rights – makes no mention at all of being directly affected, the only requirement is that personal rights... may only be personally asserted. Therefore I provided more complete evidence than required, because I proved that I was directly affected, which is not a requirement set down by the – relevant passage of the – Civil Code, but through its exaggerated powers, today's Hungarian Courts demands, therefore I PROVED THIS TOO, EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MY TASK TO DO SO!

I provided my ignored – and thus unevaluated – items of evidence:

– in the letter of lawsuit

– in my notes at the original Court

– during the hearing at the original Court

– in my counterappeal

– during the Court of Appeals hearing

– in my request of review

I shall, however, briefly summarise its essence:

The defendant, in his article Christian Hungarian State, the subject of the trial, called for the exclusion of all Jews in Hungary, basing his call on the legal continuance of the thousand-year old Christian Hungarian state. The fundamental principle of logics is that if the exclusion of ALL Jews is called for, it refers to each and every person – regarded as a Jew. There is no need to prove being ADDITIONALLY personally affected, as everyone includes everyone, separately. This is so evident that it is simply impossible to prove it further, and an absolutely illogical requirement!

In my submissions listed and at the hearings I proved that between 1938 and May 1945 I was – PERSONALLY – excluded TO THE BRINK OF DEATH, following such incitement by Christian priests. This is now HAPPENING AGAIN! The world is in such a state today that a third world war could errupt at any time between the USA (North America) and the EU on the one hand and the Muslim and Arab world, eg. Iraq and Iran on the other, pitting 3.2 billion people – half of the inhabitants of the Earth – against a mere 500 million. The proportion is thus 3 billion against the half billion. There are a further two billion people in Japan and China and we do not know what side they would take in a third world war. The wind of a third world war was first felt on 11^th September 2001, and during the Iraq war this win strengthened to become a storm. It is not known where it is headed. To exclude Jews, citing the legal continuance of thousand years of Hungarian Christianity in such a world, this insanity must be stopped. The Hungarian judiciary is not prepared to take the tiniest of steps in this. Israel and the Zionist Jewry of the whole world would be at the focal point of this world war. Thus all Hungarian Jews would also be in the focal point. If in such a global situation Hungarian Christian priests again call for the exclusion of Hungarian Jews, then this exclusion will end with gas chambers and firing squads. In this case the Hungarian anti-Semites – including the defendant – will complete the work that Hitler and Szálasi left undone at 60 per cent, because they lost the war before they could complete their great work – the extermination of all Hungarian Jews. I – whose two younger brothers István and András were murdered in spring 1945, and who was hounded to the brink of death – am personally affected! Having proved this, what else do I need to prove? This is what I want to be told, because I no longer understand the position of the Hungarian Courts, although I am a professor of legal logics at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Please acknowledge: all I asked of the Court against this Christian priest calling for exclusion that the Court establish that my personal rights were breached and to order him to cease this illegal activity – and I asked no more. It seems the Hungarian judiciary is incapable even of this. This cannot be anything other than a political act, which the second sentence of paragraph (3) of section 50 of the Constitution forbids. Yet it happened. I asked that amends are made for this – in the course of the retrial.

I inform the Court:

The binding rejection shook me greatly, because I was flabbergasted to realise that there still exist Judges in the Hungarian judiciary of today, who do not deliver verdicts in keeping with the laws of an independent democratic state of law within the European Union. We, people regarded as Jewish – by others – tolerated like lambs to the slaughter that humanity's most shameful mass murder and chasing to the brink of death be committed against us between 1938 and the spring of 1945. We had not a word of protest against it. The result: the murder of 600.000 Jews in gas chambers, or by shooting into the Danube, and torture to the brink of death of 400,000 Hungarian citizens. This is once and for all over. This we shall not allow to happen once more to Hungarian citizens – regarded as Jews. We shall take every legal step against renewed calls to exclusion, which had happened before between 1938 and the spring of 1945. This could happen again because of the loathing of 6.2 billion Earth inhabitants, especially through such incitements by priests, and the assistance of some Judges. These Court decisions provide a boost to the extreme right to step up their hounding of Jews.

This incitement to hatred, and its written form will not remain simple words and text. I agree with Minister of Education Bálint Magyar, who wrote: Everything begins in words. (speech delivered at Auschwitz-Birkenau, published in FORUM section of Népszabadság on 15^th April, 2004.). We inherited this from the animal world, the beast roars before it strikes its prey. Animal roars tamed (or rather wildened) into speeches and written articles, such as the defendant's writing, in civilisation. A writing calling for discrimination will not remain an article, it will be followed by actions (perhaps action culminating in mass murder). Incitement to hatred – which a demand for discrimination obviously is – is not freedom of speech but a murderous attack on humanity. This cannot be looked upon without actions by the judiciary of an EU-member independent democratic state of law. THIS is not democracy, yet – unintentionally – these are helped by such Court rulings. This is why I take an emphatic step against Judge Dr Mátyás Mészáros's illegal ruling with my present petition for retrial.

2.) The justification of the final rejection of my lawsuit continues thus: The binding verdict furthermore conforms to the contents of the 2002/2/740 theoretical ruling of the Supreme Court, according to which personal rights may only be asserted if the activity established as criminal can be brought into connection with a specific person. The same was established by the Supreme Court is its Pfv. IV. 20.299/2004/2. verdict, in which it declares that if the press statement was so generalised that it excludes the possibility of the direct recognition of any members of the denoted community, belonging to a community in itself cannot form the basis of assertion of personal rights. The binding verdict thus rejected the lawsuit without breach of legislation, and, in keeping with the above, it is not in conflict with the Supreme Court's theoretical decisions. (page three, final two sentences of paragraph three)

My response to the above: Beyond the above in his ruling he refers to the 740 civilian college ruling of the Supreme Court, published in the second issue of the official almanach of the Supreme Court's rulings of 2002, which was delivered by LBPfvIV under the reference number Legf. Bír. Pfv.IV.20.118/2001. (the Judge delivering the ruling, Dr Mátyás Mészáros is a MEMBER of the L.B.Pfv.IV. council). The ruling is about a case where a toilet paper factory used the plaintiff's surname to name its product. The trial deals with section 77 of the Civil Code primarily. The verdict does not reveal whether anyone had confused the toilet paper and the plaintiff. Thus in this case being personally affected was indeed unproven. This is the SINGLE theoretical decision of the Supreme Court on the basis of which Judge Mátyás Mészáros finally rejected my lawsuit. To compare this with my tragedy – which has already taken place and nearly resulted in my death – is infitely tasteless, but a statement which finally proves nothing, and Judge Dr Mátyás Mészáros is interested in. Comparing the theoretical ruling mentioned in the ruling with my being personally affected would be funny, if it were not for my series of personal tragedies. If we ignore the latter, we could believe that Judge Dr Mátyás Mészáros was joking with the ruling. Moreover, the binding verdict never referred to the theoretical ruling in question. Conclusion: I refer to facts and pieces of evidence in the present petition for retrial which the Court did not consider in the trial. My petition for retrial is therefore in keeping with every requirement of effective legislation.

The L.B. Pfv.IV.20.299/2004/2. verdict however, is not a theoretical ruling by the Supreme Court, it is nonsensical to cite it, and I cannot understand how it ended up in the so-called justification of the ruling, perhaps BECAUSE Mátyás Mészáros was interested in it, as Judge.

To summarise the second part: there is no Supreme Court ruling which could force the Court to interpret paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code as meaning that the passage may only be personally asserted can only be applied if the plaintiff proves that he is directly affected. This too is a new fact, which has not been considered by the Court.

Furthermore the general regulations of the Pp. apply to the review proceedings. Had the Judge delivering the ruling – which finally rejected my lawsuit – delivered the ruling in keeping with the regulations set down in the Pp., he would have acted according to the final passage of paragraph (3) of section 3 of Chapter I or fundamental principles, the Court's tasks in a civil trial of First Part or General Rules of the Pp: The Court is bound to provide prior information to the litigating parties of the facts that need proving, the burden of proof, and the consequences of failure to provide proof, in order to ensure that the legal dispute is settled. The Judge delivering the ruling would thus have had the obligation to inform me of the following:

a.) my pieces of evidence do not prove that I was personally affected, could I please offer more precise arguments?

b.) there is only one theoretical ruling on being personally affected, taken by the Supreme Court and included in the Supreme Court's official almanach of rulings, and said ruling is about the plaintiff and a toilet paper maker bearing the same name, what do I want to say about the above?

I received no such information, yet the Judge delivered the ruling, which degraded me. This too is a fact that provides a reason for retrial.

My notes to this:

There is in the capital of Hungary a building, its address 1055 Budapest, Markó utca 16. It was through the ornate gate of this building that the Christian priest, the defendant in the present case, who had called for the exclusion of Jews – referring to the legal continuance of a thousand years – was borne on the shoulders of a triumphantly roaring crowd. Such a shame has not been suffered by the Hungarian judiciary over the past thousand years. The fact that the third branch of government descended here by the beginning of the third millennium, within the European Union, can only be politically motivated. Some Judges ignore effective law and the fundamental rules of deliberation, they have espoused political causes, which is a fatal development! The Hungarian judiciary must take action against this immediately.

I request that my petition for retrial is accepted.

9^th July, 2004. Budapest.

Dr György Ádám

plaintiff

Pest Central District Court.

Ref. no.: 20.P.85.346/2003.

p e t i t i o n o f

r e t r i a l

by Dr György Ádám, plaintiff

against Loránt Hegedűs, Jr, defendant

for breach of personal rights.

Pest Central District Court.

Ref. no.: 20.P.85.346/2003.

Dr György Ádám plaintiff, in a lawsuit (number as above) against Loránt Hegedűs, Jr, defendant, for the breach of my personal rights set down in section 76 of the Civil Code, - acting in person, as set down in paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code – requested that a breach of law be established under point a) of paragraph (1) of section 84 of the Civil Code, and that the Court order the cessation of the illegal behaviour, as set down in point b). The Budapest City Court as Court of Appeals rejected my lawsuit on 26^th February, 2004 in its binding verdict 52.Pf.29.063/2003/4.

Against the verdict, with reference to point a) of paragraph (1) of section 260 of the Pp – and a reference to paragraph (2) – I submit the following

p e t i t i o n f o r r e t r i a l

I request that – on the basis of my arguments detailed below – a trial is set as set down in paragraph (2) of section 266 of the Pp.

J u s t i f i c a t i o n:

The defendant published an article on the front page of the 16^th District MIÉP organisation's periodical Ébresztő's 3^rd issue of the 3^rd year in 2001, entitled ”Christian Hungarian State!”, and bearing the signature of the defendant. The article is unequivocally seriously hurtful towards Hungarian citizens residing in Hungary – and termed Jewish by others – and is a provocative article calling for the EXCLUSION of Jews. He justifies the call for exclusion by stating that this was the life-giving message of a thousand years of Hungarian Christian statehood, the message passed down through a thousand years of LEGAL CONTINUANCE…” (capitalisation by plaintiff).

As I – the plaintiff – have been regarded as Jewish by everyone for eighty-two years, and on the basis of these opinions I have been EXCLUDED – in the most varied manners – for eighty years, the agitating text – considering my past – poses a mortal threat to me, therefore I launched a civil lawsuit against the defendant for breach of my personal rights, in keeping with paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code. The press statement AFFECTS ME PERSONALLY, therefore I assert my personal rights personally.

I tendered my letter of lawsuit to the PKKB on 20^th January, 2003, in which I provided a detailed account of my life, fate as a Hungarian citizen, resident of Hungary – but regarded as Jewish by everyone – sent to deathcamps, hounded to the brink of death, but due to a near-miracle a survivor.

In my letter of lawsuit and its supplements I described how the most varied EXCLUSION of Jews has taken place in Hungary over the past thousand years, for instance through so-called Jewish laws (the first was passed by King St László I in 1091). The exclusion of Hungarian persons, regarded as Jewish, has – almost always – been implemented following the incitement of – Christian – priests. Roman Popes often demanded stricted laws to exclude Hungarian Jews, which demands the Hungarian kings duly satisfied (eg. Pope Gregory IX demanded that Hungarian King Endre II increase exclusion of Jews in the Golden Bull, which was dutifully granted by the King in a subsequent piece of legislation.)

In my letter of lawsuit I described the Calvary that was my life. It all happened to me because everyone always regarded me as Jewish and never – not once – did anyone ask me whether I hold myself to be Jewish or not. This played no role in decisions – by others – to determine the path of my life.

In my letter of lawsuit I explained that the defendant's intent and goal of exclusion with regard to my person is irrelevant, as the legal situations of section 76 of the Civil Code are OBJECTIVE BINDS, and points a) and b) of paragraph (1) of section 84 of the Civil Code are objective sanctions – with no consideration for intent and goal (final paragraph, first page of my letter of lawsuit). This scientific legal argument was not considered by the Court delivering the binding verdict, did not refer to said argument in its verdict, although said argument is crucial to the outcome of the case.

My letter of lawsuit is composed of two primary segments. In the first segment (Chapter I, from paragraph 2 of page 2 to the middle of page 5) I described the horrors I suffered in my life – because of being termed Jewish. In the second segment (Chapter II, middle of page 5 to end of page 9) I quoted speeches (as haphazard examples, as I had no other option in a letter of lawsuit), which held an eery resemblance to the defendant's article published in Ébresztő, and finally – by the incitements of primarily Christian priests – led to Jewish laws, the Holocaust, the deathcamps, shootings into the Danube, the murder of 600,000 Hungarian, allegedly Jewish, citizens and the hounding to the brink of death of 400,000 Hungarian citizens (Jews).

As a conclusion to Chapter II I wrote in my letter of lawsuit: All this shows why I – a private person – was directly (!) affected in my personal rights by the defendant's article, even though the article mentions me only indirectly. This is not a mere hypothesis! I have experienced the process of EXCLUSION once before in Hungary and abroad, from simple exclusion (I was not allowed to be a tennis umpire) to mass murder, and the series of humanity's most horrific murders to this date. I do not want to experience my Fatelessness once more! (final paragraph, page 9.)

The Court of Appeals did not consider this – de jure and de facto – logical argument, did not mention it at all in its verdict – pretended that I had never put it in writing – even though it was crucial to the outcome of the case.

In Chapter III of my letter of lawsuit I analysed the rules of LOGICS of Court verdicts, which was, again, completely disregarded by the Court of Appeals, its verdict is, however, so without logic as if it had been brought not by the Judges of an independent, democratic state of law, but by laypeople who have no incling of the law; this lack of logics will be detailed in my analysis of the Court of Appeals verdict.

In my letter of lawsuit I stated which – inciting - parts of the defendant's press statement breached my personal rights. Yet I noted in the justification of the binding verdict that the three Judges who delivered the verdict – as it had not been set down conclusively – failed to understand. I wish to prevent this and will therefore list the statements – which were injurious to me – of this press statement one by one (let me note that I am not presenting new pieces of evidence, simply summing up existing evidence in an unequivocal manner).

The serious breach of my personal rights were caused by the contents of the following statements of the press statement:

1.) CHRISTIAN HUNGARIAN STATE! This address in itself is a title, which excludes persons regarded as Jews, as this address does not include non-Christians. According to the Constitution: Hungary: is a republic, an independent, democratic state of law.

2.) This is how we can address our thousand-year old home, on the basis of the gold-coverage of countless martyrdoms of ten centuries. Let me note: our thousand-year old home with 39 Jewish laws?! Yeah, right!

3.) But Jesus Christ says: ”My country is not of this world.” Here can we understand the real cause and reason of all Hungarian sufferings. ”Our fight is against the Hungarian hell: The unequivocal affirmation of the two sentences: The Hungarian hell is the presence of Jews. The Jews have come so that Hungarian Zion is destroyed too. Thus the JEW is on the rampage here!

4.) And because you cannot drive every Palestinian from the shores of the Jordan with Fascist methods putting the nazis to shame, well, they come again to the shores of the Danube, as internationalists, as nationalists, as cosmopolitans once more to kick Hungarians, because they feel like it. The meaning of this section: You cannot SMOKE OUT every Palestinian from the shores of the Jordan with methods putting the nazis to shame so again they come to the shores of the Danube, where:

– as internationalists

– as nationalists

– as cosmopolitans

once more to kick HUNGARIANS (because they feel like it)

In this section JEW is spelled out expressis verbis!

5.) They go hysteric because of the address: CHRISTIAN HUNGARIAN STATE.

The Jews say: DISCRIMINATIVE!

Plaintiff's opinion:

This cannot be denied, the section is indubitably discriminative, it incites to hatred against Hungarian Jews.

6.) Hark then Hungarian, hear the one life-giving message of a thousand years of Hungarian Christian statehood, the message passed down through a thousand years of legal continuance: EXCLUDE THEM! BECAUSE IF YOU DO NOT DO SO, THEY WILL DO IT TO YOU! (capitalisation by defendant)

The point of this section is the thousand years of LEGAL CONTINUANCE.

Murdering with 39 Jewish laws and incitements by Christian priests.

Only LIFE-GIVING message based on LEGAL CONTINUANCE:

– Exclude them

– because if you do not do it,

the JEWS will do it to you

Let me ask: how does one EXCLUDE?

- with Jewish laws?

- the ghetto?

- gas chambers?

- by shootings into the Danube?

These were the most typical methods of exclusion against Jews over the past thousand years. These are the ones to be given breathing space? Nice outlook in the third millennium before accession to the EU!

II.

The defendant replied to my letter of lawsuit in a submission tendered on 18^th April, 2003. He asked nothing, but that the Court acquire the trial documents from the acting Courts of three lawsuits. He argued that the original Courts, then the Courts of Appeals had all rejected the lawsuits of the plaintiffs, because under paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code personal rights may only be asserted personally, furthermore, the Supreme Court's ruling 13.PK. does not allow the assertion of personal rights for lack of right of suit.

Furthermore – through his representative – the defendant argued that under paragraph (1) of section 163 I presented too many arguments. The other plaintiffs wrote of themselves: Hungarian citizens of Jewish extraction and Israelite faith. It was in response to this that I noted:

– I refuse to make a statement on my extraction, this is my citizen's right

– I am an Israelite only in the eyes of others, because I do not regard myself as an Israelite, because I – for one – do not recognise any religion in my view of the world

– I am a Hungarian citizen and only this matters.

I provided a proper and scientific answer to the issues raised about paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code, and the application of ruling 13.PK, I analysed issues of fact and law.

II.

Following the above the Pest Central District Court delivered its verdict 20.P.85.346/2003/6. on 1^st July, 2003, which featured a justification of such precision that it could double as a scientific PhD paper. I have not read such a precise and logical verdict through my legal career of over half a century. It is my opinion that Hungarian Courts also employ very highly qualified Judges, which is very encouraging in an independent, democratic state of law. I shall offer a detailed comment on the original verdict in the analysis of the verdict delivered by the Court of Appeals.

III.

The defendant lodged an appeal against the original verdict on 20^th August, 2003. He writes: According to the completely clear, unequivocal and unmisinterpretable paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code, personal rights may be only personally asserted. Plaintiff suffered no personal injury by way of the article, the article is not about the plaintiff, the defendant was unaware of the existence of the plaintiff until the lawsuit was submitted, and to this day is unacquainted with the plaintiff.” (appeal page one, 3^rd paragraph from bottom, bold characters by defendant).

IV.

I made a detailed response to defendant's appeal in my counterappeal, to which I attached six supplements, filed on 5^th January, 2005. I stress the quoted part so that the Court deciding in the matter of the counterappeal can see the defendant's entirely illogical argument.

What is the relevance of the personal acquaintance of the parties – injurer and injured – to the legal stipulation (paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code) that personal rights... may only be personally asserted? The defendant – through recourse to the thousand-year old and well-oiled Hungarian – incitement to discrimination by Christian priests, breached the personal rights of every single Hungarian citizens regarded as Jews, without knowing any of them. Personal acquianctance is not a requirement of the legal situation set down in paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code, or in general of the breach of personal rights. This is the defandant's rabulistic defence. Or more precisely: by citing the legal continuance of a thousand years he calls on Christian Hungarians to exclude all Jews residing in the country. This is seriously injurious to those persons who reside in Hungary – and are regarded as Jews by others – and who (along with their families) were once before excluded to the full in the holocaust, and are again threatened with such exclusion (no personal acquaintance is required for this).

My counterappeal is, again, primarily about the interpretation of paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code. According to the defendant's logic: the original court – when it interpreted paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code – placed itself in the position of the legislative, instead of applying the legislation. This is absurd, and I have refuted this claim in detail in Chapters I-IV.

In Chapter V of my counterappeal I proved that the circumstance that I – in keeping with my personal and entirely private convictions – have no faith is completely irrelevant in this trial. My fate was always determined by the fact that others saw me, and continue to see me as Jewish..

In Chapter VI of my counterappeal I provided justification for offering further evidence of Hungarian attitudes – excluding Jews for a thousand years – and why I offered further quotes from Corpus Juris Hungarici, and why I quoted the Tiszaeszlár trial of the 19^th Century. I described how in 1946 – after the utter defeat of Germany, thus in the time of peace – there were anti-Semitic pogroms in Kunmadaras after anti-Semitic incitements, and several Jewish families were murdered. Incitements to exclusion – which threatens the life and safety of Jews – has continued in Hungary for 1100 years.

The Budapest City Court set the date for the appeals hearing for 19^th February, 2004. The minutes of the hearing do not include the fact I quoted at the trial, thus the minutes are seriously incomplete. I did not ask that they be corrected, because the Court council that prepares such unacceptable minutes, and then delivers an illegal verdict, is not worthwhile negotiating with.

At the trial I said that even in 2004 I am seen as a Jew. In January this year, around noon, I was travelling on the third metro line. At the Népliget station some 20 thugs ascended the carriage in which I was travelling, pointed at me and said: there is a rotten Jew, of gores the train to Auschwitz. Thus – I said – Christian priests' incitement to exclusion has an effect on today's youth. This fact – for some incomprehensible reason – was not included in the minutes, even though it has a significance when evaluating the merits of the case. The minutes feature the following sentence: The effect of articles, such as the one written by the defendant, keeps alive the trend that Jews, and the plaintiff, are insulted at every turn. (first page, final sentence). I never said such a thing, I never even mentioned insults, I spoke specifically of calls to exclusion. I also noted that I WAS EXCLUDED on the third metro line: I hade to get off the carriage! This fact was ignored by the Judges of the Court of Appeals and – without my knowledge – did not enter it into the minutes, which is a serious breach of the law by negligence!

The Budapest City Court, acting as Court of Appeals announced its verdict 52.Pf.29.063/2003/4. to reject my lawsuit on 26^th February, 2004.

My opinion of the – extremely seriously illegal – binding verdict.

The third page of the justification of the verdict writes: The appeal is founded, according to the following.

Then the binding verdict writes:

1.) The original Court acted correctly when it investigated first whether the plaintiff had the right to sue because of the contents of the article, but arrived at a mistaken conclusion. The decision in the matter depends on the interpretation of paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code, thus it depends on: how the passage stating that personal rights – with the exception of circumstances not arising in this case – may only be asserted in person is interpreted. The Supreme Court's ruling PK 13 could indeed not be regarded as a binding interpretation of the law, if for no other reason, than because it refers to amendments in the press, regulated in section 79 of the Civil Code. However, this latter fact allows us to conclude, that the contents of the ruling are only applicable to amendments in the press. Section 79 of the Civil Code is in the Personal rights subchapter of the Civil Code, the same place as section 76, which formed the basis of plaintiff's lawsuit, section 85 applies equally to sections 76 and 79. (verdict, page three, third paragraph lines one through seven plus one word from line eight)

Of this – as plaintiff – my opinion is as follows:

ad 1. The decision in the matter depends on the interpretation of paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code... the justification says. It refers to ruling PK13 of the Supreme Court, which the Court said was applicable EXCLUSIVELY for press amendments.

The Court, however, claimed that section 79 of the Civil Code was under subchapter personal rights, the same as section 76, which the plaintiff based his complaint on. The Court of Appeals thus – illegally – applied ruling PK13 to section 76 using an analogy.

Bódog Somló's opinion of analogies from 106 years ago:

Analogy: (similarity)

Application of certain to relationships in an unregulated manner to similar relationships. For if there are gaps in the law, because the legislative forgot to solve certain questions, or if repeated occurrence brings new relationships, which are as yet unregulated by law, the question of what guidelines to be applied when evaluating these relationships arises. A general guideline is the principle that unregulated relationships are to be regulated in the manner the legislative would have regulated them, had it thought to regulate said relationships. And how the legislative would have regulated the relationships in question can be determined from regulations enacted for similar cases. We use the assumption that every system of law is a consistent and united whole, which offers similar rulings in similar cases. If the missing regulation is made up for using a similar piece of legislation, this process is termed similarity offered by law (analogy legis). Bódog Somló. (Magyar jogi lexikon Bp. Pallas Irodalmi és Nyomdai RT. Vol I. year 1898. page 238.)

Thus an analogy, even 106 years ago, was only applicable when there was a gap in legislation, and not for a Court ruling. This reference to the PK13 ruling, when applied to sections 76 and 79 of the Civil Code – in an independent democratic state of law in the third millennium – is such a serious breach of the law, which is practically incredible as having been made by a Court of Appeals in the capital: At the same time, this latter allows the conclusion that the ruling is applicable exclusively for press amendments. But the conclusion that ruling PK13 is applicable for section 76 of the Civil Code is under no circumstances allowed. This is the logical absurdity of the subsequent justification, it is evident to all who have the tiniest knowledge of interpretation of the law!

2.) According to the binding verdict: Moreover, the behaviour of commission in the present case is identical in that according to the lawsuit the defendant harmed plaintiff's personal rights by way of a press publication. (verdict, page three, second part of paragraph 3)

My opinion:

ad 2. The behaviour of commission is not identical. The press publication is merely a form.

The behaviour of commission:

76. §: 1.) unfair discrimination

2.) breach of freedom of conscience

3.) illegal restriction of personal rights

4.) harm of body, health

– honour

– human dignity

79. §: – making false claims – presenting actual fact in false light

This statement of the binding verdict is a serious error of logics and law.

3.) According to the binding verdict: In order for the otherwise absolute personal rights /personal rights are to be honoured by everyone/ to become relative between the persons determined in paragraph /1/ of section 75 of the Civil Code, a specific breach of personal rights must take place between the given persons, in all cases of sections 76 to 83 of the Civil Code. (verdict, page three, first sentence of paragraph 4)

My opinion:

ad 3.) Sections 76-83 of the Civil Code may not be regarded as identical cases of law.

Section 76 is SPECIAL compared to the others, according to the following cases of law:

a.) any form of unfavourable discrimination according to

– sex

– race

– nationality

– faith

b.) breach of freedom of conscience

c.) illegal restriction of personal rights

d.) – harm of body, health

– honour

– human dignity.

Section 77 of the Civil Code is about rights associated with bearing a name, which can be of one person alone.

Section 78 of the Civil Code is about the protection of reputation, which can only be of one natural or legal person.

Section 79 of the Civil Code false statement made through the media, is completely different to the others, but is clearly of one person alone.

Section 80 of the Civil Code is about rights associated with images and sound recordings, which can be about one person alone

Section 81 of the Civil Code is about breach of private secrets, which can only be one person's secret

Section 82 of the Civil Code is about the breach of private dwelling, which can only be the dwelling of one person (family)

Section 83 of the Civil Code about electronic recording of data, which is of one person's data.

Thus section 76 of the Civil Code is a unique case of law in the system of breach of personal rights. The legislator is entitled to include different passages – different to the others in terms of legal instance – if the basic right (legal stipulations on the breach of personal rights) are identical. Such a white crow – but for other reasons – amongst legal stipulations on the breach of personal rights is section 79 of the Civil Code.

Such legal relationship: The SPECIFIC breach of personal rights under section 76 is completely different to such breaches under sections 77-83. For ABSOLUTE personal rights to become RELATIVE between the given persons personal rights must be SPECIFICALLY breached under all instances of sections 76-83 of the Civil Code.

My question: under section 76 of the Civil Code, does not a SPECIFIC breach of personal rights arise through DISCRIMINATION by

– sex

– race

– nationality

– faith

and by a breach of personal

– honour

– human dignity?

Does not thus the ABSOLUTE personal right become relative against those who were hurt in PERSON and thus in their honour and human dignity, by being unequivocally placed into a group through reference to race or faith? My answer: yes, the legal relationship of breach of personal rights between injurer and injured arises, regardless of personal acquaintance, or SPECIFIC reference to a given person.

4.) According to the binding verdict: Such a legal relationship is to arise between the parties for the plaintiff to be allowed to demand the application of sanctions set down in section 84 of the Civil Code against the defendant. (verdict, page three, final sentence of paragraph four)

ad 4.) My opinion of the Court's statement: Such a legal relationship did indeed arise – as I proved it in an exact manner – between the parties and therefore I DEMAND the application of the sanctions set down in section 84 of the Civil Code (as set down, word by word in point a) of paragraph (1) of section 84 of the Civil Code) against the defendant!!

5.) According to the binding verdict: According to the Court of Appeals, the conclusion is that if the plaintiff cites in his lawsuit that the defendant breached one or more of his personal rights in a press statement, the lawsuit is founded if the press statement refers to the plaintiff by name or any other manner, or if the plaintiff is personally identifiable on the basis of the contents of the press statement. It is evident, that if anyone should write down a text, which can be interpreted as one in breach of personal rights, but does not bring said text to anyone's attention, a breach of personal rights cannot be established. (page three, first two lines of the final paragraph and two words from page 4.)

My opinion:

ad 5.) The breach of my personal rights through a PRESS STATEMENT was thus committed, if the PERSON of the plaintiff is apparent from the CONTENTS, therefore allow me to quote again:

…the lawsuit is founded, if the press statement refers to the person of the plaintiff by name OR OTHER MANNER, or if the person of the plaintiff is in other way identifiable from the CONTENTS of the press statement.

My opinion: In line two of paragraph 2 of column 2 of the press statement the term JEW is featured. This REFERS to me – the plaintiff – unequivocally and personally, as for 80 years everyone has seen me as a JEW! There can be no more unequivocal reference. Was the PERSON of the plaintiff not IDENTIFIABLE from the press statement? Impossible statement! Plaintiff is most definitely identifiable, as from other similar statements.

6.) According to the binding verdict: But the case is the same if the defendant publishes a statement with such content, but in its text does not specify that it refers to the plaintiff, the plaintiff's being affected is not known to the reader, the plaintiff's being affected is not established in their minds. This occurred in the present case, because the article did not make a reference of any kind to the plaintiff, the plaintiff was not identifiable as an individual from the statement. (verdict, page three, final two sentences of final paragraph of page three and four words from page four.)

My opinion:

ad 6.) For a 1000 years identifiability is a matter of fact, not of law. Tens of thousands identify me as a Jew, therefore, according to the Christian Hungarian priest, TO BE EXCLUDED. If – provided, but not allowing – this press statement does not refer to me because I am not identifiable from the text, then IT REFERS TO NOBODY! Then what is all this? What did the defendant write? Then practically the press statement says: Exclude Nobody, because if you do not do it, Nobody will do it to you!

Is this the logic of the binding verdict in an independent democratic state of law?

I shall quote once more: ...the plaintiff's being affected is not known to the reader, the plaintiff's being affected is not established in their minds. This occurred in the present case, because the article did not make a reference of any kind to the plaintiff, the plaintiff was not identifiable as an individual from the statement. Why is the AS AN INDIVIDUAL necessary?

Where did the Court take this from? Hundreds have asked me why I did not file a lawsuit, when this Christian priest calls for the EXCLUSION OF JEWS, and I am a Jew, who has already been subjected to the most serious forms of exclusion! I experience that the official organs operating – in this country – today are more thorough, thoughtful and accurate than they were 60-70 years ago! Then an excluding legislation was brought against Jews (numerus clausus), under which I was not admitted to the university. They did not check whether György Ádám's name was featured on the document of exclusion. It was ordered that I would be taken to forced labour camp, and it was not examined whether the Jew György Ádám was mentioned by name on the document ordering the forced labour. Later (in autumn 1944) Szálasi ordered that Jews be deported to death camps, and the gendarmes and arrow cross henchmen did not check whether the Jew György Ádám was listed by name on the latest order of exclusion. In Kőszeg it was ordered that Jews weakened to the brink of death be killed in gas chambers, and it was not checked whether their names were on the exclusion list, ordering that they be taken to the gas chamber. My younger brother, on our way away from Kőszeg, was subjected to another form of exclusion, he was shot to death... as a Jew. They did not check if he was mentioned by name on the list of those to be shot to death.

Now, in 2004 I request the minimum of protection – from the Republic of Hungary, an independent democratic state of law: all I requested of the judiciary that it establishes that the Christian priest CALLING AGAIN FOR THE EXCLUSION OF JEWS defendant breached my personal rights and that the Court ban him from reoffending. At this point, a 180-degree turn was taken in the evaluation of the case. Now, when I asked the minimum of protection from the state, it was deemed – by the Court of Appeals – that I failed to prove that when the Christian priest, referring to the legal continuance of a thousand years calls again for the exclusion of Jews, his press statement referred to me, György Ádám as well. Can you deliver such a verdict in an independent democratic state of law? Other organs – empowered to do so – will answer that question.

7.) According to the binding verdict: The Court of Appeals notes that a different interpretation of paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code under identical conditions – a member of a group, who is not identifiable with the whole is given the right to litigate with reference to a press statement – would raise several difficult questions. What are the qualities that define a person as a member of a group? Is it necessary, and concurrently is it sufficient if a person regards him/herself as a member of a group – this would be in compliance with the freedom of choice of identity recognised by Hungarian law – or – as suggested by the plaintiff in the current case – the deciding factor is to be whether others, another group of people – which is to be identified as well – regard the plaintiff as a member of the group in question or perhaps should other criteria – of origins, genetics, religion, culture – be investigated? The members of which groups are entitled to the protection of their personal rights, and the members of which groups are not? Would not the right of suing, granted to all members of a potentially million-member-strong group destroy the very purpose of the right to demand protection of personal rights as an institution? (verdict, page four, paragraph two, 13 lines)

My opinion:

ad 7.) If the defendant were to injur every member of a group of several million members, every member must be protected by law.

Between 1920 and 1945 one million people were thus injured through EXCLUSION in Hungary.

The Judges ask: Would not the right of suing, granted to ALL MEMBERS of a potentially million-member-strong group destroy the very purpose of the right to demand protection of personal rights as an institution?

Most certainly: NO, it would strengthen the purpose, if millions would each file a lawsuit against calls to their exclusion published in the press! THIS is the very essence of the protection of personal rights! The question asked by the three Court of Appeals Judges is simply dumbfounding.

8.) According to the binding verdict: Because, according to the explanation above, under the currently effective legislation the plaintiff has no right to sue, irrespective of the above questions, the lawsuit is unfounded. Therefore the Court of Appeals has overturned the original Court verdict, as set down in paragraph (2) of section 253 of the Civil Code, and rejected the lawsuit. (verdict, page four, paragraph 3)

My opinion:

ad 8.) I have no right to sue? For the past 83 years I have simply had the obligation to be found? Furthermore does the Christian Hungarian state have the right to call to exclude me? Can I not even ask – the Republic of Hungary, an independent democratic state of law – the minimum protection against calls for my exclusion?

I escaped, half-dead on 2^nd May, 1945 – by a near-miracle – from death camps set up and maintained by Hungarians, and successfully avoided the death chamber. Now they call for my exclusion again. This exclusion could again take the form of the ghetto, the star of David, being shot into the Danube or any other method of exclusion employed in this country against Jews over the past thousand years.

Yet I have no right whatsoever to defend myself against the repeated calls for the EXCLUSION of Jews in this country – brought back to the agenda by Christian Hungarians? Thus the three Judges of the Budapest City Court's 52Pf obviously believe that if – on the basis of the orders of the reverend – certain individuals want to exclude me, because I am a Jew, first they will carefully read through the press statement and they will say: although we know for certain that he is a Jew, we should not exclude György Ádám because he is not named in the reverend's writing, and he cannot be identified as an individual from the press statement.

The single statement of the Court of Appeals' verdict – according to which my lawsuit was without basis – was that my person WAS NOT IDENTIFIABLE from the article.

If this was the Judges' opinion, under the third sentence of paragraph (3) of section 3 of the Pp, they would have been bound to PROVIDE PRIOR INFORMATION to the litigating parties... of facts TO BE PROVEN in order to reach a decision in the legal dispute.

Had I been informed, my primary task at the Court of Appeals hearing would have been to provide evidence, and so I did, but I would have provided more emphatic proof if I had been properly informed, because I am a man of law.

9.) According to the binding verdict: The Court of Appeals has ordered the losing plaintiff to pay trial costs for both the original hearing and the appeals hearing, on behalf of the solicitor-represented defendant, under paragraph (1) of section 78 of the Civil Code.

The defendant did not provide evidence of the solicitor's fees and costs, therefore the Court of Appeals determined the trial costs with regard to the amount of work carried out by the defendant's legal counsel, as set down in section 2 and paragraph (2) of section 3 of the statutory instrument 8/2002./III.30./ IM. (verdict, page four, paragraph four)

My opinion:

ad 9.) The justification of the entire binding verdict wastes not a single word on explaining why the Court rejected my scientific arguments and the justification set down in point ad 1 on pages 3-8 (five and a half pages) of the justification of the original Court's verdict, which explain how the plaintiff is personally affected by the writing in question. Thus the Court of Appeals breached the second passage of the second sentence of paragraph (1) of section 221 of the Pp.: a reference must be made to the reasons why the court found the case to be not sufficiently proven.

What the FB52Pf council – which delivered the verdict – did not do in its justification – although it is obligatory under the final passage of paragraph (1) of section 221 of the Pp –, I shall do in my request of review, and will analyse the reasoning of the original court's justification of the verdict.

Analysis of the original verdict:

1.) The interpretation of paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code is correct (paragraph five, page three): The grammatical and theleological interpretation of paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code is none other than that an uninjured person may not file a lawsuit for the injury suffered by another. The explanation is that in case of personal rights it is the person affected who is solely capable of decided whether they suffered an injury or not, and if yes whether they want to take actions. The legislative never intended a contrasting interpretation for the judiciary.

2.) The analogy puts me in a position of disadvantage, which the Court of Appeals ignored in its justification! An analogy cannot be applied for a ruling only for an item of legislation! (page three, paragraph 6.) The Court did not accept the defendant's reference to the Supreme Court ruling PK13. Ruling PK13 states that press amendment may only be demanded by those who were referred to – by name or other manner – in the press publication, or whoever is identifiable from the contents of the press publication. As the text clearly shows, this interpretation was set down by the Supreme Court purely for press amendment procedures. The PK13 ruling cannot be applied to section 85 of the Civil Code because it would put the plaintiff at a greater disadvantage than allowed by the Constitution. An unconstitutional interpretation is forbidden in the case of every item of legislation.

3.) According to the Judge in the original trial the analogy cannot have an implicit interpretation (page three, paragraph 9) In case of fundamental rights an implicit interpretation may only be used to favour the injured party!

4.) Explicit interpretation: Direct, personal involvement does not, in this case, mean that a given person must be named, such an explicit interpretation would be extraordinarily unfair and harmful for those involved, as there are many ways in which unfair, harmful or discriminating statements may be made about certain people without naming them specifically. (page three, paragraph 10)

5.) It is sufficient, if an essential substance of the given person is recognisable, which constitutes an attribute of their existence, recognisable to others. (page four, paragraph 1)It is identifiable that I am a Jew, that is sufficient. A deciding reason.

6.) A given person does not necessarily have to be identifiable by name, it is sufficient to relay the knowledge that the given person is a member of a community, and then the person becomes identifiable by this trait. The Civil Code does not determine which part of the identity, which essential aspect of the injured person is to be identifiable. (page four, paragraph 2)

7.) A general notion only manifests itself through specifics, whether we assume subjective or objective existence. Notions, thus including the notion of a community, is naturally built in reality, physically through its members. (page four, paragraph 6)

8.) The clear logic of the original verdict: The notion and its real elements cannot be separated, as without material existence the notions that represent them would not exist either, these correlations are inseperable.” (page four, paragraph seven)

9.) Neither the Constitution or the separate laws name those they refer to, yet any natural person may file a lawsuit, assert their rights with reference to the Constitution or the Civil Code. (page four, paragraph eight) This is clear reasoning, irrefutably logical, yet the Court of Appeals ignored it!

10.) Essential argument: The existence of collective rights, identification or being identified (as in the current lawsuit) with the characteristics of a group cannot strip a person of the entirety of their general human rights. (page five, paragraph two, underlining by the original Judge).

11.) If every member of a community is injured, all of them are affected, therefore any one of them is entitled to file a lawsuit. (page five, paragraph four) This reasoning is an unequivocal answer to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, expressed later, in the final two sentences of paragraph two of page four: The members of which groups are entitled to the protection of their personal rights, and the members of which groups are not? Would not the right of suing, granted to all members of a potentially million-member-strong group destroy the very purpose of the right to demand protection of personal rights as an institution?

NO, it would be strengthened, which is what the original Judge proved. This is no real threat for now, I alone have filed a lawsuit.

12.) In the original verdict the Judge writes: When interpreting the Civil Code the only correct guidelines are the Constitution and the international obligations assumed by the Republic of Hungary! (page five, paragraph four)

13.) Discrimination cannot exist in practice without the physical existence of specific people, as every group consists of real people. Jewry in itself, as a notion, does not exist, Jewry, as a notion, is composed of specific natural persons.

A community or a group united by certain aspects always consists of specific people, which specific people often cannot be named because of the size of the group, but the statements on the group refer to each and every member of the group, on the basis of the principle of the many includes the few.

History has proved that discrimination against a community has often been (can often be) accompanied by tragic and irreperable consequences for a large number of specific, natural people, of people who can be named by name. It is logically impossible that a view, opinion, position, decision or call to action against a community does not refer to the individual members of said community, if it were not so then the acts of discrimination, often raised to state level in the recent past, would not have had any effect on specific natural persons, and the natural persons affected by the laws would not have suffered their personal tragedies. According to the Court the Constitution, and the international covenants referred to, forbid all forms of discrimination, whether they apply to people, groups or communities. (page six, paragraphs two and four through seven) The Judge of the original Court PROVES beyond any doubt that the Court of Appeals claimed completely illogically that the press statement does not refer to me – who everyone sees as a Jew.

14.) In case of a community it is often physically impossible, or formally excluded that the community as a whole take a stance to protect its members, for the simple reason of the large number of members in a community, as it is inconceivable that every single member of a community of many tens of thousands could each take the same stance against the same breach of law. The fact that phisically community rights cannot be asserted on the basis of the Civil Code cannot mean that the individual members of a community are not allowed to assert their constitutional and citizen's rights. For this reason the members of a community or group must be given the opportunity to each seek protection for their rights. It would be extraordinarily unfair and unjust if only the community as a whole were to have the right to take action against injuries it suffered, but its members should not have this right. (bold characters by Judge of original Court)

This reasoning shows clearly that the Court of Appeals' arguments about my being affected were completely nonsensical.

15.) It is beyond doubt that thus the Court must in all instances examine the aspects of belonging to a given group, the civil law habits of a group, and whether the given person has the right to sue with reference to a particular group, but this cannot be a point of consideration in case of the protection of a person's constitutional and citizen's rights. The Court will in many cases have additional workload, but this cannot be a consideration during the proceedings. A group can indeed be formed in many ways within society, it is thus the task and responsibility of the Court to determine in the given case whether a group or its members are entitled to assert their personal rights through the Court. Reference to sentencing precedents is irrelevant in this instance. Sentencing precedents does not and cannot mean such a rigin, immutable system (as the Judge's decision is not a norm), which could not be broken by the interpretation of the Constitution and binding international covenants. Sentencing precedents may change, and must change! The transformation of precedents is the guiding principle, which fills legislation with content, and shows the ideal, optimum content and effect on certain persons of certain items of legislation from the point of view of society.

The original Court used crystal clear logic to provide prior REFUTATION (!) of the Court of Appeals verdict's rabulistics. Because the Court of Appeals ignored all of these, this is my seventeenth reason for requesting retrial.

VI.

To summarise:

I provided my ignored – and thus unevaluated – items of evidence:

– in the letter of lawsuit

– in my notes at the original Court

– during the hearing at the original Court

– in my counterappeal

– during the Court of Appeals hearing

– in my request of review

I shall, however, briefly summarise its essence:

I inform the Court:

Pest Central District Court,

I have listed above seventeen reasons for submitting my petition for retrial, although a single one would have been sufficient to approve my petition.

I request that my petition for retrial is accepted.

9^th July, 2004. Budapest.

Dr György Ádám

plaintiff

Pest Central District Court.

Ref. no.: 20.P.85.346/2003.

p e t i t i o n o f

r e t r i a l

by Dr György Ádám, plaintiff

against Loránt Hegedűs, Jr, defendant

for breach of personal rights.

Pest Central District Court.

Ref. no.: 20.P.85.346/2003.

I, Dr György Ádám, plaintiff have submitted a petition for retrial in the lawsuit launched against Loránt Hegedűs, Jr, defendant, under the above reference number. Not knowing what the Court would decide – I made separate petitions for retrial against two Court decisions, and I submit these separately:

a.) One of my petitions for retrial is directed against the Budapest City Court's binding verdict 52.Pf.29.063/2003/4.,

b.) The other is against the Supreme Court's ruling Pfv.E.21.020/2004/2.

This is necessary – I believe – because the 105^th Act of 2001 so confused section 270 of the Pp. that it no longer tells – not even the professional – whether under paragraph (1) of section 273 of the Pp. the petition for retrial, should a litigating party deem it necessary, is to be made against the rejecting ruling by the Supreme Court Judge, or against the binding verdict.

I submitted a petition for retrial against both the binding verdict and the Supreme Court Judge ruling so that the Court can decide which one is necessary to order a retrial.

9^th July, 2004. Budapest.

Dr György Ádám

plaintiff