T

To the Supreme Court of the Republic of Hungary,

as Court of Review.

Dr György Ádám, plaintiff, against the Budapest City Court, as Court of Appeal's binding verdict 52.Pf.29.063/2003/4. brought on 26^th February, 2004 in the lawsuit against Loránt Hegedűs, Jr, defendant, and delivered to me on 5^th March, 2004, under paragraph (1) of section 270 of the Civil trial code Pp. - regarding that under point paragraph (2) of Pp. the binding verdict is illegal, as under the stipulations of point b) of paragraph (2) of section 270 of the Pp. a review of the case is necessary in order to develop legal practices, and as under sub-point ba) a theoretical legal dispute has arisen with regard to the verdict and the Supreme Court (LB) has not taken a decision in the matter in a manner noted in the official almanach of the Supreme Court's rulings – I submit the following

r e q u e s t o f r e v i e w:

I request that the binding verdict is abolished and that in keeping with the original verdict 20.P.85.346/2003/10. brought by the Pest Central District Court (PKKB) on 1^st July, it be established that the defendant breached my personal rights in the manner set down in point a) of paragraph (1) of section 84 of the Civil Code, and that he is banned from repreating said crime, as set down in point b).

I demand no trail costs in the suit of law.

I request that my request of review is EVALUATED AT THE HEARING, as set down in the second passage of paragraph (1) of section 274 of the Civil Code.

J u s t i f i c a t i o n:

The defendant published an article on the front page of the 16^th District MIÉP organisation's periodical Ébresztő's 3^rd issue of the 3^rd year in 2001, entitled ”Christian Hungarian State!”, and bearing the signature of the defendant. The article is unequivocally seriously hurtful towards Hungarian citizens residing in Hungary – and termed Jewish by others – and is a provocative article calling for the EXCLUSION of Jews. He justifies the call for exclusion by stating that this was the life-giving message of a thousand years of Hungarian Christian statehood, the message passed down through a thousand years of LEGAL CONTINUANCE…” (capitalisation by plaintiff).

As I – the plaintiff – have been regarded as Jewish by everyone for eighty-two years, and on the basis of these opinions I have been EXCLUDED – in the most varied manners – for eighty years, the agitating text – considering my past – poses a mortal threat to me, therefore I launched a civil lawsuit against the defendant for breach of my personal rights, in keeping with paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code. The press statement AFFECTS ME PERSONALLY, therefore I assert my personal rights personally.

I tendered my letter of lawsuit to the PKKB on 20^th January, 2003, in which I provided a detailed account of my life, fate as a Hungarian citizen, resident of Hungary – but regarded as Jewish by everyone – sent to deathcamps, hounded to the brink of death, but due to a near-miracle a survivor.

In my letter of lawsuit and its supplements I described how the most varied EXCLUSION of Jews has taken place in Hungary over the past thousand years, for instance through so-called Jewish laws (the first was passed by King St László I in 1091). The exclusion of Hungarian persons, regarded as Jewish, has – almost always – been implemented following the incitement of – Christian – priests. Roman Popes often demanded stricted laws to exclude Hungarian Jews, which demands the Hungarian kings duly satisfied (eg. Pope Gregory IX demanded that Hungarian King Endre II increase exclusion of Jews in the Golden Bull, which was dutifully granted by the King in a subsequent piece of legislation.)

In my letter of lawsuit I described the Calvary that was my life. It all happened to me because everyone always regarded me as Jewish and never – not once – did anyone ask me whether I hold myself to be Jewish or not. This played no role in decisions – by others – to determine the path of my life.

In my letter of lawsuit I explained that the defendant's intent and goal of exclusion with regard to my person is irrelevant, as the legal situations of section 76 of the Civil Code are OBJECTIVE BINDS, and points a) and b) of paragraph (1) of section 84 of the Civil Code are objective sanctions – with no consideration for intent and goal (final paragraph, first page of my letter of lawsuit). This scientific legal argument was not considered by the Court delivering the binding verdict, did not refer to said argument in its verdict, although said argument is crucial to the outcome of the case.

My letter of lawsuit is composed of two primary segments. In the first segment (Chapter I, from paragraph 2 of page 2 to the middle of page 5) I described the horrors I suffered in my life – because of being termed Jewish. In the second segment (Chapter II, middle of page 5 to end of page 9) I quoted speeches (as haphazard examples, as I had no other option in a letter of lawsuit), which held an eery resemblance to the defendant's article published in Ébresztő, and finally – by the incitements of primarily Christian priests – led to Jewish laws, the Holocaust, the deathcamps, shootings into the Danube, the murder of 600,000 Hungarian, allegedly Jewish, citizens and the hounding to the brink of death of 400,000 Hungarian citizens (Jews).

As a conclusion to Chapter II I wrote in my letter of lawsuit: All this shows why I – a private person – was directly (!) affected in my personal rights by the defendant's article, even though the article mentions me only indirectly. This is not a mere hypothesis! I have experienced the process of EXCLUSION once before in Hungary and abroad, from simple exclusion (I was not allowed to be a tennis umpire) to mass murder, and the series of humanity's most horrific murders to this date. I do not want to experience my Fatelessness once more! (final paragraph, page 9.)

The Court of Appeals did not consider this – de jure and de facto – logical argument, did not mention it at all in its verdict – pretended that I had never put it in writing – even though it was crucial to the outcome of the case.

In Chapter III of my letter of lawsuit I analysed the rules of LOGICS of Court verdicts, which was, again, completely disregarded by the Court of Appeals, its verdict is, however, so without logic as if it had been brought not by the Judges of an independent, democratic state of law, but by laypeople who have no incling of the law; this lack of logics will be detailed in my analysis of the Court of Appeals verdict.

In my letter of lawsuit I stated which – inciting - parts of the defendant's press statement breached my personal rights. Yet I noted in the justification of the binding verdict that the three Judges who delivered the verdict – as it had not been set down conclusively – failed to understand. I wish to prevent this and will therefore list the statements – which were injurious to me – of this press statement one by one (let me note that I am not presenting new pieces of evidence, simply summing up existing evidence in an unequivocal manner).

The serious breach of my personal rights were caused by the contents of the following statements of the press statement:

1.) CHRISTIAN HUNGARIAN STATE! This address in itself is a title, which excludes persons regarded as Jews, as this address does not include non-Christians. According to the Constitution: Hungary: is a republic, an independent, democratic state of law.

2.) This is how we can address our thousand-year old home, on the basis of the gold-coverage of countless martyrdoms of ten centuries. Let me note: our thousand-year old home with 39 Jewish laws?! Yeah, right!

3.) But Jesus Christ says: ”My country is not of this world.” Here can we understand the real cause and reason of all Hungarian sufferings. ”Our fight is against the Hungarian hell: The unequivocal affirmation of the two sentences: The Hungarian hell is the presence of Jews. The Jews have come so that Hungarian Zion is destroyed too. Thus the JEW is on the rampage here!

4.) And because you cannot drive every Palestinian from the shores of the Jordan with Fascist methods putting the nazis to shame, well, they come again to the shores of the Danube, as internationalists, as nationalists, as cosmopolitans once more to kick Hungarians, because they feel like it. The meaning of this section: You cannot SMOKE OUT every Palestinian from the shores of the Jordan with methods putting the nazis to shame so again they come to the shores of the Danube, where:

– as internationalists

– as nationalists

– as cosmopolitans

once more to kick HUNGARIANS (because they feel like it)

In this section JEW is spelled out expressis verbis!

5.) They go hysteric because of the address: CHRISTIAN HUNGARIAN STATE.

The Jews say: DISCRIMINATIVE!

Plaintiff's opinion:

This cannot be denied, the section is indubitably discriminative, it incites to hatred against Hungarian Jews.

6.) Hark then Hungarian, hear the one life-giving message of a thousand years of Hungarian Christian statehood, the message passed down through a thousand years of legal continuance: EXCLUDE THEM! BECAUSE IF YOU DO NOT DO SO, THEY WILL DO IT TO YOU! (capitalisation by defendant)

The point of this section is the thousand years of LEGAL CONTINUANCE.

Murdering with 39 Jewish laws and incitements by Christian priests.

Only LIFE-GIVING message based on LEGAL CONTINUANCE:

– Exclude them

– because if you do not do it,

the JEWS will do it to you

Let me ask: how does one EXCLUDE?

a.) with Jewish laws?

b.) the ghetto?

c.) gas chambers?

d.) by shootings into the Danube?

These were the most typical methods of exclusion against Jews over the past thousand years. These are the ones to be given breathing space? Nice outlook in the third millennium before accession to the EU!

II.

The defendant replied to my letter of lawsuit in a submission tendered on 18^th April, 2003. He asked nothing, but that the Court acquire the trial documents from the acting Courts of three lawsuits. He argued that the original Courts, then the Courts of Appeals had all rejected the lawsuits of the plaintiffs, because under paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code personal rights may only be asserted personally, furthermore, the Supreme Court's ruling 13.PK. does not allow the assertion of personal rights for lack of right of suit.

Furthermore – through his representative – the defendant argued that under paragraph (1) of section 163 I presented too many arguments. The other plaintiffs wrote of themselves: Hungarian citizens of Jewish extraction and Israelite faith. It was in response to this that I noted:

– I refuse to make a statement on my extraction, this is my citizen's right

– I am an Israelite only in the eyes of others, because I do not regard myself as an Israelite, because I – for one – do not recognise any religion in my view of the world

– I am a Hungarian citizen and only this matters.

I provided a proper and scientific answer to the issues raised about paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code, and the application of ruling 13.PK, I analysed issues of fact and law.

III.

Following the above the Pest Central District Court delivered its verdict 20.P.85.346/2003/6. on 1^st July, 2003, which featured a justification of such precision that it could double as a scientific PhD paper. I have not read such a precise and logical verdict through my legal career of over half a century. It is my opinion that Hungarian Courts also employ very highly qualified Judges, which is very encouraging in an independent, democratic state of law. I shall offer a detailed comment on the original verdict in the analysis of the verdict delivered by the Court of Appeals.

IV.

The defendant lodged an appeal against the original verdict on 20^th August, 2003. He writes: According to the completely clear, unequivocal and unmisinterpretable paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code, personal rights may be only personally asserted. Plaintiff suffered no personal injury by way of the article, the article is not about the plaintiff, the defendant was unaware of the existence of the plaintiff until the lawsuit was submitted, and to this day is unacquainted with the plaintiff.” (appeal page one, 3^rd paragraph from bottom, bold characters by defendant).

I made a detailed response to defendant's appeal in my counterappeal, to which I attached six supplements, filed on 5^th January, 2005. I stress the quoted part so that the Court deciding in the matter of the counterappeal can see the defendant's entirely illogical argument.

What is the relevance of the personal acquaintance of the parties – injurer and injured – to the legal stipulation (paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code) that personal rights... may only be personally asserted? The defendant – through recourse to the thousand-year old and well-oiled Hungarian – incitement to discrimination by Christian priests, breached the personal rights of every single Hungarian citizens regarded as Jews, without knowing any of them. Personal acquianctance is not a requirement of the legal situation set down in paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code, or in general of the breach of personal rights. This is the defandant's rabulistic defence. Or more precisely: by citing the legal continuance of a thousand years he calls on Christian Hungarians to exclude all Jews residing in the country. This is seriously injurious to those persons who reside in Hungary – and are regarded as Jews by others – and who (along with their families) were once before excluded to the full in the holocaust, and are again threatened with such exclusion (no personal acquaintance is required for this).

My counterappeal is, again, primarily about the interpretation of paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code. According to the defendant's logic: the original court – when it interpreted paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code – placed itself in the position of the legislative, instead of applying the legislation. This is absurd, and I have refuted this claim in detail in Chapters I-IV.

In Chapter V of my counterappeal I proved that the circumstance that I – in keeping with my personal and entirely private convictions – have no faith is completely irrelevant in this trial. My fate was always determined by the fact that others saw me, and continue to see me as Jewish..

In Chapter VI of my counterappeal I provided justification for offering further evidence of Hungarian attitudes – excluding Jews for a thousand years – and why I offered further quotes from Corpus Juris Hungarici, and why I quoted the Tiszaeszlár trial of the 19^th Century. I described how in 1946 – after the utter defeat of Germany, thus in the time of peace – there were anti-Semitic pogroms in Kunmadaras after anti-Semitic incitements, and several Jewish families were murdered. Incitements to exclusion – which threatens the life and safety of Jews – has continued in Hungary for 1100 years.

VI.

The Budapest City Court set the date for the appeals hearing for 19^th February, 2004. The minutes of the hearing do not include the fact I quoted at the trial, thus the minutes are seriously incomplete. I did not ask that they be corrected, because the Court council that prepares such unacceptable minutes, and then delivers an illegal verdict, is not worthwhile negotiating with.

At the trial I said that even in 2004 I am seen as a Jew. In January this year, around noon, I was travelling on the third metro line. At the Népliget station some 20 thugs ascended the carriage in which I was travelling, pointed at me and said: there is a rotten Jew, of gores the train to Auschwitz. Thus – I said – Christian priests' incitement to exclusion has an effect on today's youth. This fact – for some incomprehensible reason – was not included in the minutes, even though it has a significance when evaluating the merits of the case. The minutes feature the following sentence: The effect of articles, such as the one written by the defendant, keeps alive the trend that Jews, and the plaintiff, are insulted at every turn. (first page, final sentence). I never said such a thing, I never even mentioned insults, I spoke specifically of calls to exclusion. I also noted that I WAS EXCLUDED on the third metro line: I hade to get off the carriage! This fact was ignored by the Judges of the Court of Appeals and – without my knowledge – did not enter it into the minutes, which is a serious breach of the law by negligence!

The Budapest City Court, acting as Court of Appeals announced its verdict 52.Pf.29.063/2003/4. to reject my lawsuit on 26^th February, 2004.

VII.

My opinion of the – extremely seriously illegal – binding verdict.

The third page of the justification of the verdict writes: The appeal is founded, according to the following.

Then the binding verdict writes:

1.) The original Court acted correctly when it investigated first whether the plaintiff had the right to sue because of the contents of the article, but arrived at a mistaken conclusion. The decision in the matter depends on the interpretation of paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code, thus it depends on: how the passage stating that personal rights – with the exception of circumstances not arising in this case – may only be asserted in person is interpreted. The Supreme Court's ruling PK 13 could indeed not be regarded as a binding interpretation of the law, if for no other reason, than because it refers to amendments in the press, regulated in section 79 of the Civil Code. However, this latter fact allows us to conclude, that the contents of the ruling are only applicable to amendments in the press. Section 79 of the Civil Code is in the Personal rights subchapter of the Civil Code, the same place as section 76, which formed the basis of plaintiff's lawsuit, section 85 applies equally to sections 76 and 79. (verdict, page three, third paragraph lines one through seven plus one word from line eight)

Of this – as plaintiff – my opinion is as follows:

ad 1. The decision in the matter depends on the interpretation of paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code... the justification says. It refers to ruling PK13 of the Supreme Court, which the Court said was applicable EXCLUSIVELY for press amendments.

The Court, however, claimed that section 79 of the Civil Code was under subchapter personal rights, the same as section 76, which the plaintiff based his complaint on. The Court of Appeals thus – illegally – applied ruling PK13 to section 76 using an analogy.

Bódog Somló's opinion of analogies from 106 years ago:

Analogy: (similarity)

Application of certain to relationships in an unregulated manner to similar relationships. For if there are gaps in the law, because the legislative forgot to solve certain questions, or if repeated occurrence brings new relationships, which are as yet unregulated by law, the question of what guidelines to be applied when evaluating these relationships arises. A general guideline is the principle that unregulated relationships are to be regulated in the manner the legislative would have regulated them, had it thought to regulate said relationships. And how the legislative would have regulated the relationships in question can be determined from regulations enacted for similar cases. We use the assumption that every system of law is a consistent and united whole, which offers similar rulings in similar cases. If the missing regulation is made up for using a similar piece of legislation, this process is termed similarity offered by law (analogy legis). Bódog Somló. (Magyar jogi lexikon Bp. Pallas Irodalmi és Nyomdai RT. Vol I. year 1898. page 238.)

Thus an analogy, even 106 years ago, was only applicable when there was a gap in legislation, and not for a Court ruling. This reference to the PK13 ruling, when applied to sections 76 and 79 of the Civil Code – in an independent democratic state of law in the third millennium – is such a serious breach of the law, which is practically incredible as having been made by a Court of Appeals in the capital: At the same time, this latter allows the conclusion that the ruling is applicable exclusively for press amendments. But the conclusion that ruling PK13 is applicable for section 76 of the Civil Code is under no circumstances allowed. This is the logical absurdity of the subsequent justification, it is evident to all who have the tiniest knowledge of interpretation of the law!

2.) According to the binding verdict: Moreover, the behaviour of commission in the present case is identical in that according to the lawsuit the defendant harmed plaintiff's personal rights by way of a press publication. (verdict, page three, second part of paragraph 3)

My opinion:

ad 2. The behaviour of commission is not identical. The press publication is merely a form.

The behaviour of commission:

76. §: 1.) unfair discrimination

2.) breach of freedom of conscience

3.) illegal restriction of personal rights

4.) harm of body, health

– honour

– human dignity

79. §: – making false claims – presenting actual fact in false light

This statement of the binding verdict is a serious error of logics and law.

3.) According to the binding verdict: In order for the otherwise absolute personal rights /personal rights are to be honoured by everyone/ to become relative between the persons determined in paragraph /1/ of section 75 of the Civil Code, a specific breach of personal rights must take place between the given persons, in all cases of sections 76 to 83 of the Civil Code. (verdict, page three, first sentence of paragraph 4)

My opinion:

ad 3.) Sections 76-83 of the Civil Code may not be regarded as identical cases of law.

Section 76 is SPECIAL compared to the others, according to the following cases of law:

a.) any form of unfavourable discrimination according to

– sex

– race

– nationality

– faith

b.) breach of freedom of conscience

c.) illegal restriction of personal rights

d.) – harm of body, health

– honour

– human dignity.

Section 77 of the Civil Code is about rights associated with bearing a name, which can be of one person alone.

Section 78 of the Civil Code is about the protection of reputation, which can only be of one natural or legal person.

Section 79 of the Civil Code false statement made through the media, is completely different to the others, but is clearly of one person alone.

Section 80 of the Civil Code is about rights associated with images and sound recordings, which can be about one person alone

Section 81 of the Civil Code is about breach of private secrets, which can only be one person's secret

Section 82 of the Civil Code is about the breach of private dwelling, which can only be the dwelling of one person (family)

Section 83 of the Civil Code about electronic recording of data, which is of one person's data.

Thus section 76 of the Civil Code is a unique case of law in the system of breach of personal rights. The legislator is entitled to include different passages – different to the others in terms of legal instance – if the basic right (legal stipulations on the breach of personal rights) are identical. Such a white crow – but for other reasons – amongst legal stipulations on the breach of personal rights is section 79 of the Civil Code.

Such legal relationship: The SPECIFIC breach of personal rights under section 76 is completely different to such breaches under sections 77-83. For ABSOLUTE personal rights to become RELATIVE between the given persons personal rights must be SPECIFICALLY breached under all instances of sections 76-83 of the Civil Code.

My question: under section 76 of the Civil Code, does not a SPECIFIC breach of personal rights arise through DISCRIMINATION by

- sex

- race

- nationality

- faith

and by a breach of personal

- honour

- human dignity?

Does not thus the ABSOLUTE personal right become relative against those who were hurt in PERSON and thus in their honour and human dignity, by being unequivocally placed into a group through reference to race or faith? My answer: yes, the legal relationship of breach of personal rights between injurer and injured arises, regardless of personal acquaintance, or SPECIFIC reference to a given person.

4.) According to the binding verdict: Such a legal relationship is to arise between the parties for the plaintiff to be allowed to demand the application of sanctions set down in section 84 of the Civil Code against the defendant. (verdict, page three, final sentence of paragraph four)

ad 4.) My opinion of the Court's statement: Such a legal relationship did indeed arise – as I proved it in an exact manner – between the parties and therefore I DEMAND the application of the sanctions set down in section 84 of the Civil Code (as set down, word by word in point a) of paragraph (1) of section 84 of the Civil Code) against the defendant!!

5.) According to the binding verdict: According to the Court of Appeals, the conclusion is that if the plaintiff cites in his lawsuit that the defendant breached one or more of his personal rights in a press statement, the lawsuit is founded if the press statement refers to the plaintiff by name or any other manner, or if the plaintiff is personally identifiable on the basis of the contents of the press statement. It is evident, that if anyone should write down a text, which can be interpreted as one in breach of personal rights, but does not bring said text to anyone's attention, a breach of personal rights cannot be established. (page three, first two lines of the final paragraph and two words from page 4.)

My opinion:

ad 5.) The breach of my personal rights through a PRESS STATEMENT was thus committed, if the PERSON of the plaintiff is apparent from the CONTENTS, therefore allow me to quote again:

…the lawsuit is founded, if the press statement refers to the person of the plaintiff by name OR OTHER MANNER, or if the person of the plaintiff is in other way identifiable from the CONTENTS of the press statement.

My opinion: In line two of paragraph 2 of column 2 of the press statement the term JEW is featured. This REFERS to me – the plaintiff – unequivocally and personally, as for 80 years everyone has seen me as a JEW! There can be no more unequivocal reference. Was the PERSON of the plaintiff not IDENTIFIABLE from the press statement? Impossible statement! Plaintiff is most definitely identifiable, as from other similar statements.

6.) According to the binding verdict: But the case is the same if the defendant publishes a statement with such content, but in its text does not specify that it refers to the plaintiff, the plaintiff's being affected is not known to the reader, the plaintiff's being affected is not established in their minds. This occurred in the present case, because the article did not make a reference of any kind to the plaintiff, the plaintiff was not identifiable as an individual from the statement. (verdict, page three, final two sentences of final paragraph of page three and four words from page four.)

My opinion:

ad 6.) For a 1000 years identifiability is a matter of fact, not of law. Tens of thousands identify me as a Jew, therefore, according to the Christian Hungarian priest, TO BE EXCLUDED. If – provided, but not allowing – this press statement does not refer to me because I am not identifiable from the text, then IT REFERS TO NOBODY! Then what is all this? What did the defendant write? Then practically the press statement says: Exclude Nobody, because if you do not do it, Nobody will do it to you!

Is this the logic of the binding verdict in an independent democratic state of law?

I shall quote once more: ...the plaintiff's being affected is not known to the reader, the plaintiff's being affected is not established in their minds. This occurred in the present case, because the article did not make a reference of any kind to the plaintiff, the plaintiff was not identifiable as an individual from the statement. Why is the AS AN INDIVIDUAL necessary?

Where did the Court take this from? Hundreds have asked me why I did not file a lawsuit, when this Christian priest calls for the EXCLUSION OF JEWS, and I am a Jew, who has already been subjected to the most serious forms of exclusion! I experience that the official organs operating – in this country – today are more thorough, thoughtful and accurate than they were 60-70 years ago! Then an excluding legislation was brought against Jews (numerus clausus), under which I was not admitted to the university. They did not check whether György Ádám's name was featured on the document of exclusion. It was ordered that I would be taken to forced labour camp, and it was not examined whether the Jew György Ádám was mentioned by name on the document ordering the forced labour. Later (in autumn 1944) Szálasi ordered that Jews be deported to death camps, and the gendarmes and arrow cross henchmen did not check whether the Jew György Ádám was listed by name on the latest order of exclusion. In Kőszeg it was ordered that Jews weakened to the brink of death be killed in gas chambers, and it was not checked whether their names were on the exclusion list, ordering that they be taken to the gas chamber. My younger brother, on our way away from Kőszeg, was subjected to another form of exclusion, he was shot to death... as a Jew. They did not check if he was mentioned by name on the list of those to be shot to death.

Now, in 2004 I request the minimum of protection – from the Republic of Hungary, an independent democratic state of law: all I requested of the judiciary that it establishes that the Christian priest CALLING AGAIN FOR THE EXCLUSION OF JEWS defendant breached my personal rights and that the Court ban him from reoffending. At this point, a 180-degree turn was taken in the evaluation of the case. Now, when I asked the minimum of protection from the state, it was deemed – by the Court of Appeals – that I failed to prove that when the Christian priest, referring to the legal continuance of a thousand years calls again for the exclusion of Jews, his press statement referred to me, György Ádám as well. Can you deliver such a verdict in an independent democratic state of law? Other organs – empowered to do so – will answer that question.

7.) According to the binding verdict: The Court of Appeals notes that a different interpretation of paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code under identical conditions – a member of a group, who is not identifiable with the whole is given the right to litigate with reference to a press statement – would raise several difficult questions. What are the qualities that define a person as a member of a group? Is it necessary, and concurrently is it sufficient if a person regards him/herself as a member of a group – this would be in compliance with the freedom of choice of identity recognised by Hungarian law – or – as suggested by the plaintiff in the current case – the deciding factor is to be whether others, another group of people – which is to be identified as well – regard the plaintiff as a member of the group in question or perhaps should other criteria – of origins, genetics, religion, culture – be investigated? The members of which groups are entitled to the protection of their personal rights, and the members of which groups are not? Would not the right of suing, granted to all members of a potentially million-member-strong group destroy the very purpose of the right to demand protection of personal rights as an institution? (verdict, page four, paragraph two, 13 lines)

My opinion:

ad 7.) If the defendant were to injur every member of a group of several million members, every member must be protected by law.

Between 1920 and 1945 one million people were thus injured through EXCLUSION in Hungary.

The Judges ask: Would not the right of suing, granted to ALL MEMBERS of a potentially million-member-strong group destroy the very purpose of the right to demand protection of personal rights as an institution?

Most certainly: NO, it would strengthen the purpose, if millions would each file a lawsuit against calls to their exclusion published in the press! THIS is the very essence of the protection of personal rights! The question asked by the three Court of Appeals Judges is simply dumbfounding.

8.) According to the binding verdict: Because, according to the explanation above, under the currently effective legislation the plaintiff has no right to sue, irrespective of the above questions, the lawsuit is unfounded. Therefore the Court of Appeals has overturned the original Court verdict, as set down in paragraph (2) of section 253 of the Civil Code, and rejected the lawsuit. (verdict, page four, paragraph 3)

My opinion:

ad 8.) I have no right to sue? For the past 83 years I have simply had the obligation to be found? Furthermore does the Christian Hungarian state have the right to call to exclude me? Can I not even ask – the Republic of Hungary, an independent democratic state of law – the minimum protection against calls for my exclusion?

I escaped, half-dead on 2^nd May, 1945 – by a near-miracle – from death camps set up and maintained by Hungarians, and successfully avoided the death chamber. Now they call for my exclusion again. This exclusion could again take the form of the ghetto, the star of David, being shot into the Danube or any other method of exclusion employed in this country against Jews over the past thousand years.

Yet I have no right whatsoever to defend myself against the repeated calls for the EXCLUSION of Jews in this country – brought back to the agenda by Christian Hungarians? Thus the three Judges of the Budapest City Court's 52Pf obviously believe that if – on the basis of the orders of the reverend – certain individuals want to exclude me, because I am a Jew, first they will carefully read through the press statement and they will say: although we know for certain that he is a Jew, we should not exclude György Ádám because he is not named in the reverend's writing, and he cannot be identified as an individual from the press statement.

The single statement of the Court of Appeals' verdict – according to which my lawsuit was without basis – was that my person WAS NOT IDENTIFIABLE from the article.

If this was the Judges' opinion, under the third sentence of paragraph (3) of section 3 of the Pp, they would have been bound to PROVIDE PRIOR INFORMATION to the litigating parties... of facts TO BE PROVEN in order to reach a decision in the legal dispute.

Had I been informed, my primary task at the Court of Appeals hearing would have been to provide evidence, and so I did, but I would have provided more emphatic proof if I had been properly informed, because I am a man of law.

9.) According to the binding verdict: The Court of Appeals has ordered the losing plaintiff to pay trial costs for both the original hearing and the appeals hearing, on behalf of the solicitor-represented defendant, under paragraph (1) of section 78 of the Civil Code.

The defendant did not provide evidence of the solicitor's fees and costs, therefore the Court of Appeals determined the trial costs with regard to the amount of work carried out by the defendant's legal counsel, as set down in section 2 and paragraph (2) of section 3 of the statutory instrument 8/2002./III.30./ IM. (verdict, page four, paragraph four)

My opinion:

ad 9.) The justification of the entire binding verdict wastes not a single word on explaining why the Court rejected my scientific arguments and the justification set down in point ad 1 on pages 3-8 (five and a half pages) of the justification of the original Court's verdict, which explain how the plaintiff is personally affected by the writing in question. Thus the Court of Appeals breached the second passage of the second sentence of paragraph (1) of section 221 of the Pp.: a reference must be made to the reasons why the court found the case to be not sufficiently proven.

VIII.

What the FB52Pf council – which delivered the verdict – did not do in its justification – although it is obligatory under the final passage of paragraph (1) of section 221 of the Pp –, I shall do in my request of review, and will analyse the reasoning of the original court's justification of the verdict.

Analysis of the original verdict:

1.) The interpretation of paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code is correct (paragraph five, page three): The grammatical and theleological interpretation of paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code is none other than that an uninjured person may not file a lawsuit for the injury suffered by another. The explanation is that in case of personal rights it is the person affected who is solely capable of decided whether they suffered an injury or not, and if yes whether they want to take actions. The legislative never intended a contrasting interpretation for the judiciary.

2.) The analogy puts me in a position of disadvantage, which the Court of Appeals ignored in its justification! An analogy cannot be applied for a ruling only for an item of legislation! (page three, paragraph 6.) The Court did not accept the defendant's reference to the Supreme Court ruling PK13. Ruling PK13 states that press amendment may only be demanded by those who were referred to – by name or other manner – in the press publication, or whoever is identifiable from the contents of the press publication. As the text clearly shows, this interpretation was set down by the Supreme Court purely for press amendment procedures. The PK13 ruling cannot be applied to section 85 of the Civil Code because it would put the plaintiff at a greater disadvantage than allowed by the Constitution. An unconstitutional interpretation is forbidden in the case of every item of legislation.

3.) According to the Judge in the original trial the analogy cannot have an implicit interpretation (page three, paragraph 9) In case of fundamental rights an implicit interpretation may only be used to favour the injured party!

4.) Explicit interpretation: Direct, personal involvement does not, in this case, mean that a given person must be named, such an explicit interpretation would be extraordinarily unfair and harmful for those involved, as there are many ways in which unfair, harmful or discriminating statements may be made about certain people without naming them specifically. (page three, paragraph 10)

5.) It is sufficient, if an essential substance of the given person is recognisable, which constitutes an attribute of their existence, recognisable to others. (page four, paragraph 1)It is identifiable that I am a Jew, that is sufficient. A deciding reason.

6.) A given person does not necessarily have to be identifiable by name, it is sufficient to relay the knowledge that the given person is a member of a community, and then the person becomes identifiable by this trait. The Civil Code does not determine which part of the identity, which essential aspect of the injured person is to be identifiable. (page four, paragraph 2)

7.) A general notion only manifests itself through specifics, whether we assume subjective or objective existence. Notions, thus including the notion of a community, is naturally built in reality, physically through its members. (page four, paragraph 6)

8.) The clear logic of the original verdict: The notion and its real elements cannot be separated, as without material existence the notions that represent them would not exist either, these correlations are inseperable.” (page four, paragraph seven)

9.) Neither the Constitution or the separate laws name those they refer to, yet any natural person may file a lawsuit, assert their rights with reference to the Constitution or the Civil Code. (page four, paragraph eight) This is clear reasoning, irrefutably logical, yet the Court of Appeals ignored it!

10.) Essential argument: The existence of collective rights, identification or being identified (as in the current lawsuit) with the characteristics of a group cannot strip a person of the entirety of their general human rights. (page five, paragraph two, underlining by the original Judge).

11.) If every member of a community is injured, all of them are affected, therefore any one of them is entitled to file a lawsuit. (page five, paragraph four) This reasoning is an unequivocal answer to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, expressed later, in the final two sentences of paragraph two of page four: The members of which groups are entitled to the protection of their personal rights, and the members of which groups are not? Would not the right of suing, granted to all members of a potentially million-member-strong group destroy the very purpose of the right to demand protection of personal rights as an institution?

NO, it would be strengthened, which is what the original Judge proved. This is no real threat for now, I alone have filed a lawsuit.

12.) In the original verdict the Judge writes: When interpreting the Civil Code the only correct guidelines are the Constitution and the international obligations assumed by the Republic of Hungary! (page five, paragraph four)

13.) Discrimination cannot exist in practice without the physical existence of specific people, as every group consists of real people. Jewry in itself, as a notion, does not exist, Jewry, as a notion, is composed of specific natural persons.

A community or a group united by certain aspects always consists of specific people, which specific people often cannot be named because of the size of the group, but the statements on the group refer to each and every member of the group, on the basis of the principle of the many includes the few.

History has proved that discrimination against a community has often been (can often be) accompanied by tragic and irreperable consequences for a large number of specific, natural people, of people who can be named by name. It is logically impossible that a view, opinion, position, decision or call to action against a community does not refer to the individual members of said community, if it were not so then the acts of discrimination, often raised to state level in the recent past, would not have had any effect on specific natural persons, and the natural persons affected by the laws would not have suffered their personal tragedies. According to the Court the Constitution, and the international covenants referred to, forbid all forms of discrimination, whether they apply to people, groups or communities. (page six, paragraphs two and four through seven) The Judge of the original Court PROVES beyond any doubt that the Court of Appeals claimed completely illogically that the press statement does not refer to me – who everyone sees as a Jew.

14.) In case of a community it is often physically impossible, or formally excluded that the community as a whole take a stance to protect its members, for the simple reason of the large number of members in a community, as it is inconceivable that every single member of a community of many tens of thousands could each take the same stance against the same breach of law. The fact that phisically community rights cannot be asserted on the basis of the Civil Code cannot mean that the individual members of a community are not allowed to assert their constitutional and citizen's rights. For this reason the members of a community or group must be given the opportunity to each seek protection for their rights. It would be extraordinarily unfair and unjust if only the community as a whole were to have the right to take action against injuries it suffered, but its members should not have this right. (bold characters by Judge of original Court)

This reasoning shows clearly that the Court of Appeals' arguments about my being affected were completely nonsensical.

15.) It is beyond doubt that thus the Court must in all instances examine the aspects of belonging to a given group, the civil law habits of a group, and whether the given person has the right to sue with reference to a particular group, but this cannot be a point of consideration in case of the protection of a person's constitutional and citizen's rights. The Court will in many cases have additional workload, but this cannot be a consideration during the proceedings. A group can indeed be formed in many ways within society, it is thus the task and responsibility of the Court to determine in the given case whether a group or its members are entitled to assert their personal rights through the Court. Reference to sentencing precedents is irrelevant in this instance. Sentencing precedents does not and cannot mean such a rigin, immutable system (as the Judge's decision is not a norm), which could not be broken by the interpretation of the Constitution and binding international covenants. Sentencing precedents may change, and must change! The transformation of precedents is the guiding principle, which fills legislation with content, and shows the ideal, optimum content and effect on certain persons of certain items of legislation from the point of view of society.

The original Court used crystal clear logic to provide prior REFUTATION (!) of the Court of Appeals verdict's rabulistics.

There is nothing to add to this!

IX.

In the petition of my present request of review I declared that the binding verdict is illegal under paragraph (2) of section 270 of the Pp, and it influences the evaluation of the merits of the case, and a review of necessary in order to guarantee the unity of legal practice, and the Supreme Court has yet to take a decision in a manner published in the official almanach of the rulings of the Supreme Court.

The legal question of theoretical significance – as I set down in the petition of the present request of review – is the interpretation of paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code, according to which personal rights ...may only be personally asserted. (abbreviation by Gy. Á.)

This instance is interpreted differently by the different Courts. Some Courts – through absolutely illegal justifications – incorporate the PK13 ruling of the Supreme Court, made for section 79 (press amendments), into the interpretation while applying section 76. Other Courts demand such additional conditions for the assertion of personal rights, being named by name or a characteristic – typical of one person – which ensures that the natural person filing the lawsuit is IDENTIFIABLE AS AN INDIVIDUAL. These interpretations ignore the absolutely evident fact that if a person breaches personal rights in such a way that it is apparent that the personal rights of all members of the given group is breached, then the breach of personal rights is ESTABLISHED with reference to every member of the group SEPARATELY, and the sanctions for the breach of said rights (paragraph (1) of section 84 of the Civil Code) may be asserted by every member of the group separately, regardless of whether one or more persons, injured in their personal rights, demand the assertion of their rights in a civil trial, if the conditions of section 76 of the Civil Code were met.

For me – who have practiced law in this country for decades – it is obvious where this nonsensical argument – which was applied by the Court of Appeals for paragraph (1) of section 85 of the Civil Code – comes from. Earlier, other Courts did not establish the Christian priest's press statement calling for exclusion, as a breach of personal rights, they consistently applied ruling PK13 and paragraph (1) of section 85. Now – in my lawsuit, and legal dispute, won at the first Court – after I PROVED, in a different manner, but with irrefutable logic in the eyes of the law that the defendant breached my personal rights and that I assert said right PERSONALLY – they did not want to let down their Judge colleagues, thus in an independent democractic state of law we still have the practice of defending the uniform, a relic of the feudal ages (though in this instance it is the Judge's robes, much like the priest's surplice, that is defended).

It is my opinion that this – a breach of personal rights by the defendant – cannot be defended, whatever the Supreme Court of the Republic of Hungary decides in the matter of the request of review.

Please deliver a verdict at a HEARING in keeping with the merits of the case.

26^th March, 2004. Budapest.

Dr György Ádám

plaintiff

The Supreme Court of the Republic of Hungary, as Court of Review.

r e q u e s t o f r e v i e w

by Dr György Ádám, plaintiff

represented by:

the plaintiff himself, as solicitor

against Loránt Hegedűs, Jr, defendant,

in which the plaintiff requests that the Budapest City Court, as Court of Appeals' binding verdict 52.Pf.29.063/4. be abolished, and in keeping with the original verdict of the PKKB, verdict 20.P.85.346/2003/10., it be established that the defendant breached plaintiff's personal rights, and requests that the defendant be banned from repeating the offence.

I request that the legal dispute be settled at a HEARING.